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Venture Capital and Preferred Stock 
Charles R. Korsmo† 
INTRODUCTION 
The time is ripe for reconsidering the jurisprudence of 
preferred stock.1 Scholarly attention to the subject has, to this 
point, been fleeting.2 Perhaps this inattention is rooted in a 
  
 † Assistant Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. J.D., 
Yale Law School. I am grateful to the participants in the 2012 National Business Law 
Scholars Conference and the Case Western Reserve University School of Law Summer 
Scholarship Workshop for their helpful comments, and to Dean Lawrence Mitchell for 
research support. All errors are my own. 
 1 As is discussed more fully infra Part I, preferred stock provides investors 
with certain rights in addition to those possessed by owners of common stock. Among 
the most common preferred stock rights are special priorities to receive dividends 
(which may be cumulative if the company fails to pay), and a liquidation preference 
giving the preferred priority over common stock in the receipt of any proceeds of a 
liquidation. These rights are frequently accompanied by a panoply of subsidiary 
contractual protections.  
 2 A 1954 article provided an extensive review of the technique of drafting 
preferred stock issues. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Preferred Stock—Law and 
Draftsmanship, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 243 (1954). After Buxbaum’s effort, a long silence 
followed. Subsequent treatments include Victor Brudney, Standards of Fairness and 
the Limits of Preferred Stock Modifications, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 445 (1973), and 
Lawrence Mitchell, The Puzzling Paradox of Preferred Stock (And Why We Should Care 
About It), 51 BUS. LAW. 443 (1996), along with a student note on unfair treatment of 
preferred stockholders, Jeffrey S. Stamler, Note, Arrearage Elimination and the 
Preferred Stock Contract: A Survey and a Proposal for Reform, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1335 
(1988). William W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter have a forthcoming article on the 
subject, William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock (U. 
Penn. L. Sch. Instit. for L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 13-3, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2214015. In addition, a number of recent articles have 
analyzed aspects of the use of preferred stock in venture capital financing. See, e.g., 
Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309 
(2008); William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and 
Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891 (2002) [hereinafter Bratton, Downside]; Jesse 
M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 967 (2006); D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 315 (2005). There also exists a somewhat more substantial financial 
literature on preferred stock. 
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notion that preferred stock is something of a relic from an earlier 
era of corporate finance. After all, more than half a century has 
passed since Benjamin Graham and David Dodd concluded that 
preferred stock was “fundamentally unsatisfactory,” offering 
many of the respective downsides of equity and debt, and few of 
the respective upsides.3 Perhaps the neglect also stems from an 
impression that the law governing preferred stock is settled and 
simple, and that the primary legal questions surrounding 
preferred stock are technical matters of draftsmanship. 
Neither of these notions could be further from the truth. 
First, preferred stock, far from being an outmoded relic, is the 
investment vehicle of choice for venture capitalists (VCs) investing 
in today’s high-risk, cutting-edge startup companies.4 The nominal 
dollar value of venture capital financing—while large enough in 
absolute terms5—dramatically understates the importance of 
venture capital to economic growth and technological innovation.6 
A recent survey found that U.S. companies that have relied on 
venture capital financing at some point in their history 
  
 3 BENJAMIN GRAHAM ET AL., SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND 
TECHNIQUE 374 (4th ed. 1962). And, indeed, “preferred [stock] as a mode of finance by 
mature firms declined markedly in the latter part of the twentieth century.” Bratton, 
Downside, supra note 2, at 923. Furthermore, the so-called Collins Amendment to 
Dodd-Frank will phase out the treatment of trust-preferred securities as equity capital 
for bank holding companies. See SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & 
AFFILIATES, THE DODD-FRANK ACT: COMMENTARY AND INSIGHTS 23-24 (2010). 
According to a working paper, this regulatory change is likely to substantially curtail a 
form of preferred stock that had recently made up as much as three quarters of 
preferred issuances by dollar value. See Jarl G. Kallberg et al., Preferred Stock: Some 
Insights into Capital Structure 8 (Mar. 8, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1108673. 
 4 See, e.g., Bratton, Downside, supra note 2, at 892 (“Convertible preferred 
stock is the dominant financial contract in the venture capital market, at least in the 
United States.” (footnote omitted)); Fried & Ganor, supra note 2, at 970 (“VCs investing 
in U.S. startups almost always receive convertible preferred stock with substantial 
liquidation preferences.”). Preferred stock is “convertible” if the stockholder has the 
right to convert shares of preferred stock into common stock on specified terms. 
 5 The total dollar amount of new venture capital investment exploded to 
$105 billion in 2000, at the height of the dot-com boom, before cratering to a low of less 
than $20 billion in 2003. Following the 2007–2008 financial crisis, the level of new venture 
capital investment has rebounded to $25 to $30 billion per year. See 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION, MONEY TREE 
REPORT Q1 2012, available at https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/ 
nav.jsp?page=historical (last visited Mar. 1, 2013). 
 6 See, e.g., Duke K. Bristow et al., Venture Capital Formation and Access: 
Lingering Impediments of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 77, 80 (“[VCs] perform a vital function for the economy and for society.”); Josh 
Lerner, Boom and Bust in the Venture Capital Industry and the Impact on Innovation, 
87 FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV., no. 4, at 25 (“[Venture capital is] an 
important contributor to technological innovation and economic prosperity . . . .”). 
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generate revenue equal to approximately 21 percent of GDP.7 
Companies that were backed by venture capital early in their 
existence include present-day giants and technological trailblazers 
such as Amazon, Apple, Costco, eBay, Facebook, Google, 
Medtronic, Staples, and Starbucks.8  
In addition, a trio of recent opinions out of the Delaware 
Chancery Court9 reveal that the legal issues surrounding 
preferred stock are not only very much live, but also attended 
by a great deal of confusion—and even disagreement—as to 
what the law of preferred stock should aim to achieve. While I 
will argue that the Delaware Chancery Court arrived at a 
sensible outcome in each case, the Chancellors were unwilling, 
or perhaps unable, to flesh out a full and satisfying framework 
for their decisions. Furthermore, the reasoning announced by 
the Chancellors threatens to bring destabilizing consequences to 
the venture capital industry. As such, these three cases provide 
an excellent opportunity to reassess the law’s treatment of 
preferred stockholders in the venture capital context. 
Preferred stock, as discussed below, combines some of 
the features of debt with some of the features of equity. Debt 
holders are typically treated as outsiders to the corporation, 
with their rights and obligations exhausted by contract.10 Equity-
holders are traditionally treated as corporate insiders, with any 
contractual rights and obligations they might bargain for 
augmented—or even supplanted—by fiduciary rights and 
obligations.11 As a result of preferred stock’s hybrid character, 
legal treatment of preferred stockholders has long straddled 
the dividing line between corporate law and contract law.12  
Any reassessment of this treatment, then, must address 
two questions at the outset. First, to what extent, if any, should 
  
 7 NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION, VENTURE IMPACT: THE 
ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF VENTURE CAPITAL-BACKED COMPANIES TO THE U.S. 
ECONOMY 2 (6th ed. 2011).  
 8 Id. at 10. 
 9 SV Inv. Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d 973 (Del. Ch. 2010); 
LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re Trados Inc. 
S’holder Litig. (In re Trados), No. 1512-cc, 2009 WL 2225958 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009). 
 10 See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1507-
08 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 3 (“Lenders sit ‘outside’ of 
[the] corporation, and look to specific, bargained for rights for protection rather than 
the apparatuses of governance and fiduciary duty.”). 
 11 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 3 (“The [common stockholders’] interest 
can be viewed contractually, but the contract that emerges is almost entirely incomplete, 
with open-ended fiduciary duties substituted for negotiated financial rights.”). 
 12 Id. at 4 (“Preferred stock sits on a fault line between two great private law 
paradigms, corporate law and contract law.”). 
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preferred stockholders be entitled to fiduciary protection from 
exploitation by common stockholders? Phrased differently, 
when, if ever, should preferred stockholders be given protections 
that they have not bargained for and explicitly secured by 
contract? The second question is the flip-side of the first: to what 
extent, if any, should common stockholders be entitled to fiduciary 
protection against exploitation by preferred stockholders? Phrased 
differently, when, if ever, should a right or power contracted for by 
the preferred stockholders be subject to and restrained by 
fiduciary obligations? 
This article canvasses the possible responses to these 
questions.13 These responses range from the idea that corporate 
actions disadvantaging preferred stockholders should always 
be subject to fiduciary review under a fairness standard of 
some kind14 to the notion that fiduciary review has essentially 
no role to play in preferred stock.15 Somewhere in the middle lie 
solutions like imposing fiduciary duties owed to the firm as an 
entity or, alternatively, defining a “Zone of Preferences” akin to 
the so-called “Zone of Insolvency” for creditors. Such a 
framework—discussed more fully below—would give fiduciary 
protections to preferred stockholders whenever they are likely to 
be residual claimants on the firm’s earnings, but not otherwise. 
The major conclusion of this article is that the best 
solution lies at one of the extremes: VC holders of preferred stock 
should never be afforded fiduciary protections, and they should 
always be required to rely on the protections of their contract.16 
  
 13 See infra Parts IV and V. 
 14 Examples of such arguments can be found, for example, in Brudney, supra 
note 2, at 465-66, Mitchell, supra note 2, at 444-45, and Stamler, supra note 2, 1342-44. 
These arguments are discussed more fully below. 
 15 A fairly extreme statement of this proposition is found in Baird & 
Henderson, supra note 2. Indeed, it is only subsidiary to their broader proposition that 
“it may make sense to eliminate the concept of fiduciary duty from corporate law 
altogether,” in favor of a more limited duty owed by directors to “investors and 
strangers alike” to “attend to the affairs of the corporation and act in good faith . . . .” 
Id. at 1315-16. 
 16 In order to operationalize this recommendation, it would, of course, be 
necessary to define what constitutes preferred stock more precisely than the law has 
done thus far. Furthermore, it would be necessary to define usable indicia, allowing 
legislatures and courts (and investors) to determine when preferred stock will be 
treated as “VC-held,” and thus will not be extended fiduciary protections. Other 
complications include the treatment of preferred stock if the original holders transfer it 
to less-sophisticated parties. Such questions of implementation are beyond the scope of 
this article. The objective here is at once more broad and more modest: to persuade the 
reader that an economically significant space exists where fiduciary treatment of 
preferred stockholders is inappropriate. Defining the precise boundaries of that space 
requires further analysis, and will be done in a future work. 
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Starting from first principles, I will examine the traditional 
rationales for imposing fiduciary duties and argue that they 
are inapposite in the context of preferred stock used for venture 
capital financing.17 The sophisticated nature of VCs and their 
frequent status as repeat players, the heavily bargained nature of 
venture capital financing, advances in contracting technique, and 
the lack of any clear majoritarian defaults or norms of fairness all 
combine to make corporate fiduciary duties an unnecessary—and 
potentially destructive—supplement to contractual bargaining. 
The fact that VC holders of preferred stock should not 
be entitled to fiduciary protection, however, does not imply that 
they should not owe fiduciary duties to the common 
stockholders. Indeed, I will conclude that, even in the venture 
capital context—perhaps especially in the venture capital 
context—fiduciary protections for common stockholders are 
generally appropriate.18 A note of caution should be sounded, 
however: Care must be taken not to allow fiduciary duties to 
displace voluntary bargains and destabilize contractual 
relationships. Deciding what is “fair” in a given venture capital 
scenario is unlikely to be a straightforward proposition, and is 
likely to be particularly difficult to determine in hindsight. If 
venture capital is to remain a vital force for innovation and 
wealth creation, courts must be careful, “lest they upset what 
they do not understand.”19  
As a result, the fiduciary duties imposed on preferred 
stockholders in relation to common stockholders should be 
carefully limited to the so-called “gap filler” fiduciary duties 
envisioned by contractarian scholars, rather than expanded to 
encompass broader normative notions of “fairness.”20 Any 
attempt to use fiduciary duties to impose a contract-trumping, 
  
 17 See infra Part IV. 
 18 See infra Part V. 
 19 Baird & Henderson, supra note 2, at 1314. 
 20 See, e.g., FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 92-93 (1996). Kelli Alces describes the contractarian 
view of corporate law that “fiduciary duties are useful gap fillers in the contracts that 
make up the corporation and exist because parties to a contract could never provide for 
every contingency in advance.” Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary 
Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 241-42 (2009). Alces goes on to note that, under this view, 
“[f]iduciary duties fill inevitable gaps in contracts and should be interpreted in light of 
what the parties would have agreed to had they explicitly negotiated terms providing 
for the situation before the court.” Id. at 242; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Presentation of Much Ado about Little? Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of 
Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 281, 284-85 (2007) (“In the contractarian theory of the 
firm, fiduciary duties are viewed as gap fillers by which courts resolve disputes falling 
through the cracks of incomplete contracts.”). 
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externally imposed “fairness” requirement21 is likely to do more 
harm than good. 
This article proceeds in six parts. Part I provides a brief 
introduction to preferred stock and its use in the venture 
capital industry. Part II provides a typology of the most 
common ways in which the interests of preferred stockholders 
and common stockholders can come into conflict. Part III gives 
an overview of the case law regarding fiduciary duties and 
protections for preferred stockholders, including three recent 
Delaware Chancery Court opinions, and then surveys the 
potential modifications of this law.  
Parts IV and V form the analytical core of the article. 
Part IV addresses the first question posed above: when should 
VC holders of preferred stock receive corporate fiduciary-style 
protection from common stockholders? After surveying the 
potential justifications for fiduciary duties, this part concludes 
that VCs should be left to rely on contractual precautions. Part 
V performs the same analysis for the second question posed 
above: when should common stockholders be entitled to 
fiduciary-style protection from VC holders of preferred stock? 
This part argues that the traditional justifications for fiduciary 
duties do apply in this context, leading to the conclusion that 
VC preferred stockholders should owe fiduciary duties to 
common stockholders. 
Part VI briefly shows how this analysis brings clarity to 
the case law, leading to the same results the Delaware courts 
have thus far achieved, but with greater clarity. The article 
closes by suggesting some simple measures the Delaware 
courts (or the Delaware legislature) could implement to create 
even greater predictability and utility in the law surrounding 
preferred stock. 
  
 21 The contractarian conception of fiduciary duty is generally thought of as 
being in the ascendant in the modern era. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, 
Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1744 
n.50 (2006) (citations omitted) (describing contractarianism as the “dominant legal 
academic view”). Nonetheless, a number of prominent scholars have argued for a 
noncontractual conception of fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, The 
Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1724-29 (1989-
90). 
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I. PREFERRED STOCK 
A. What Is Venture Capital? 
At the outset, it is essential to have at least a rough idea 
of what is meant by venture capital. For better or for worse, 
“there is no standard, fixed-in-concrete definition” of the term.22 
Some idea of what venture capital is, however, can be gleaned 
from what VCs do.23 One of the most influential descriptions of 
what VCs do was set forth by General Georges Doriot, co-founder 
of the company American Research & Development, which was a 
trailblazing venture capital firm in the post-WWII era.  
General Doriot described his investment strategy as 
having the following attributes, which are more or less 
characteristic of venture capital activity today: (1) an emphasis 
on new technology, products, and techniques; (2) active, and 
sometimes even controlling, participation of the venture 
capitalist in the actual management of the business; (3) 
investment in outstanding people (the entrepreneurs) at least 
as much as in outstanding business plans; (4) investment at an 
early stage of development, but after intellectual property has 
been secured; (5) a time horizon ranging from a year or two to 
as long as ten years, followed by “exit” through an initial public 
offering (IPO) or sale of the entire enterprise; and (6) 
investments where the VC can add value through technical, 
financial, and management expertise.24  
We might add three other standard attributes to 
General Doriot’s list. First, venture capital financing tends to 
be done in “rounds,” with additional capital being injected in 
stages. The number of financing rounds can vary depending on 
when in the company’s life venture financing is obtained, but 
the classical progression moves from an early “seed” round, 
through several intermediate rounds (usually referred to as 
“first round,” “second round,” and so on), and finally to a 
“mezzanine” round meant to finance the company until the VC 
  
 22 1 JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL, BUYOUTS, 
RESTRUCTURINGS AND REORGANIZATIONS § 1.1 (2d ed. 1995). 
 23 Among the largest and most prominent venture capital firms are Greylock 
Partners, Sequoia Capital, Menlo Ventures, Oak Investment Partners, Highland Capital 
Partners, Bain Capital, Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, and Morgenthaler. The Next 
Big Thing 2011: The Top 50 Venture-Funded Companies, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704132204576190644237905576.html.  
 24 ARTHUR C. MERRILL, INVESTING IN THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION: A 
SERIOUS SEARCH FOR GROWTH STOCKS IN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY 168 (1962). 
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can exit through an IPO or sale.25 Second, whether by design or 
by accident, VC investment tends to present an all-or-nothing 
proposition, where a few home runs generating enormous gains 
are hoped to outweigh the far more common strikeout where 
the company is never profitable and the VC loses all or most of 
the investment.26 Third, the “capital” that funds VCs tends to 
be highly concentrated. Venture capital firms limit their 
number of investors to avoid regulation under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, which exempts entities with fewer than 
100 investors.27 With an average fund size of approximately 
$150 million,28 even with the maximum number of investors, 
the average investment would be $1.5 million. And although 
the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 
created a new exemption that theoretically allows up to 500 
investors, the exemption is available only with regard to 
“qualified investors,” defined as individuals with at least $5 
million in liquid investments or institutions with at least $25 
million in liquid investments.29 In either case, the practical 
threshold for participation is far higher than the most familiar 
benchmark for investor sophistication, the “accredited 
investor,” with $200,000 in annual income or $1 million in 
liquid net worth.30 
Several of the attributes described above merit 
emphasis. VCs are active, rather than passive, investors. They 
are sophisticated about the financial and, often, the technical 
aspects of the business.31 They are concentrated, engaged, and 
informed. As discussed below, in each of these respects, VCs 
diverge sharply from the typical conception of the stockholder 
in a public corporation. 
  
 25 1 BARTLETT, supra note 22, at 6-7. 
 26 Id. at 2-3. 
 27 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2006). 
 28 As of “2010, the average venture fund size was $149 million.” See Nat’l 
Venture Capital Ass’n, Frequently Asked Questions About Venture Capital, NVCA, 
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?Itemid=147 (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). 
 29 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(51)(A). 
 30 See Rule 501 of Regulation D of the 1933 Securities Act, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.501(a)(5)-(6) (1989). 
 31 1 BARTLETT, supra note 22, at 4 (“The investors are usually experienced 
professionals with formal academic training in business and finance and on-the-job 
training as apprentices at a venture fund or financial institution.”). 
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B. What Is Preferred Stock? 
Preferred stock has long been regarded as an 
“anomalous security.”32 Preferred stock is not, in fact, a single 
thing; there is no Platonic ideal for preferred stock. No single 
feature or set of features is found in every issuance of preferred 
stock that could be said to define it. Instead, the rights that 
accompany ownership of any particular share of preferred stock are 
simply those that are set forth in the issuing corporation’s charter.33 
As a result, preferred stock comes in a bewildering variety.34  
Indeed, the important thing to note at the outset is the 
highly heterogeneous nature of preferred stock. Preferred stock—
particularly as it is used in venture capital financing—is hardly a 
one-size-fits-all security. Rather, preferred stock is a bespoke 
security. The needs of the circumstances are carefully measured, 
and the ultimate terms of a preferred stock issue are typically 
finely tailored, heavily negotiated, and “sealed with a thick stack 
of documents.”35 As a result, one must be especially cautious in 
attempting to generalize about the incentives, motivations, and 
goals of preferred stock and preferred stockholders. 
Nonetheless, some preferences are common to most issues 
of preferred stock. Most characteristically, preferred stockholders 
generally have a right to receive specified dividends before the 
common stockholders may receive any.36 While the board may 
elect to skip preferred dividends at its discretion, unpaid 
preferred dividends are typically cumulative—that is, any 
arrearages will accumulate, and these arrearages must be paid off 
before any dividends may be paid to the common stockholders. 
Accompanying this dividend preference is usually a right to 
priority over common stockholders in receiving the proceeds of 
a liquidation.37 Thus, upon liquidation, preferred stockholders 
  
 32 Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 243. 
 33 See, e.g., id. (“The primary source of a [preferred] share’s legal rights is the 
share contract. There is no ideal preferred stock but only a collection of attributes the 
share contract says makes up a share of preferred stock.”); Mitchell, supra note 2, at 
445 (“Preferred stockholders are preferred precisely to the extent that the corporation’s 
charter gives them an advantage over common shareholders.”). 
 34 Technically, any shares that possess rights or privileges that differ from 
the statutory defaults (i.e., one share, one vote; equal shares of dividends) can be 
considered “preferred shares,” thus baking increased variability into the very definition 
of preferred stock. 
 35 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 47. 
 36 Id. at 45-47; see also WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 288-92 (5th ed. 1993).  
 37 KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 36, 288-92.  
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stand in line ahead of common stockholders, but behind 
creditors. Preferred stock may also be “participating” or 
“nonparticipating.” Nonparticipating preferred is entitled to 
only the specified dividend and liquidation proceeds, and thus 
has limited upside. Participating preferred additionally shares 
in the upside by receiving a pro-rata portion of any dividends 
and liquidation proceeds paid to the common. 
These more standard preferences may be accompanied 
by a host of other preferences, protections, and detriments. 
Among these are a right to convert preferred into common 
shares, a right to demand redemption of the preferred stock, a 
right to force liquidation of the company, and procedural or 
substantive protections against various transactions that would 
dilute or otherwise injure the value of the preferred (discussed 
more fully below).38 Conversely, the firm may retain the right to 
force conversion of the preferred stock into common stock, or to 
force redemption of the preferred pursuant to a specified 
procedure and formula.  
Historically, preferred stockholders rarely had the 
ability to vote in board elections, except when contingent voting 
rights would kick in upon failure to pay scheduled dividends.39 
This stood in contrast to the common shareholders who, by 
default, elected the board and voted on fundamental corporate 
decisions. This is no longer the case, however, in the context of 
modern venture capital financing. As noted above, venture 
capital is almost always provided in stages.40 With each 
subsequent stage, the VC receives additional preferred stock, 
which typically carries voting as well as economic rights. As a 
result, the VC gains increasing voting control of the board with 
  
 38 See generally Buxbaum, supra note 2; see also Fried & Ganor, supra note 2, 
at 987 (“VCs typically negotiate for a catch-all provision in addition to a list of 
provisions that explicitly require their consent for most major transactions. Such catch-
all provisions allow the preferred shareholders to veto any action that materially 
modifies their rights under their agreement with the company.”). 
 39 See Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 243 (“[Preferred stock] probably cannot vote 
in the election of corporate management but may have some contingent voting rights 
for certain proposed actions and upon default in dividend payments.”). The classic case 
involved such a share structure, where preferred stockholders gained the ability to vote 
in board elections if four consecutive dividend payments were missed. See Zahn v. 
Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1947).  
 40 See Smith, supra note 2, at 323 (“[V]enture capitalists often rely on the practice 
of staging their investments[.]”); William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of 
Venture Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 506 (1990) (“The most important 
mechanism for controlling the venture is staging the infusion of capital.”). 
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each subsequent round of financing.41 Indeed, a recent survey 
found that by the final stage of venture capital investment before 
an IPO, the VC preferred stockholders controlled a majority of the 
board more often than the common stockholders did.42 
C. Why Do VCs Prefer Preferred Stock? 
As noted above, VCs in the United States who are investing 
in startup companies almost always hold preferred stock. Given the 
significant risk that holding preferred stock may create a conflict of 
interest between VCs and the entrepreneurs and employees at 
portfolio companies, who typically hold common stock, it is a 
matter of some debate why preferred stock is so dominant.43 Adding 
to the mystery, as detailed in the next part, is the potential 
vulnerability of the preferred to exploitation by the common, which 
is exacerbated by the almost nonexistent protections courts have 
provided to preferred stockholders historically. 
A number of suggestions have been offered to explain 
preferred stock’s dominance in VC financing.44 Of course, the most 
basic reason for using preferred stock is that it can be specifically 
tailored to give VCs special preferences and protections. VCs in 
the United States typically receive convertible preferred stock 
with a liquidation preference45—that is, the preferred stock may 
at some point be converted into common stock, and the preferred 
stock is entitled to receive a specified amount of the proceeds from 
a liquidation before the common stockholders receive anything. 
This liquidation preference is often remarkably large, greatly 
exceeding the size of the initial investment.46 As a result, the cash-
  
 41 See Smith, supra note 2, at 326-27 (“Because venture capitalists typically 
gain additional board seats with each round of investment, over time the board 
composition provisions of venture-backed companies tend to move from ‘entrepreneur 
control’ or ‘contingent control’ to ‘investor control.’” With these additional board seats, 
venture capitalists gain increasing voting rights with each round of investment.). 
 42 Id. at 327 (finding that in more than three-quarters of the firms where sole 
control was exercised by either the common or the preferred, control was held by the 
preferred). 
 43 See Fried & Ganor, supra note 2, at 967-75, 988-89. 
 44 See id. at 982-86 for a survey of possible explanations; see also Bratton, 
Downside, supra note 2, at 916. 
 45 Fried & Ganor, supra note 2, at 970, 981-82 (VCs “invest in startups 
almost exclusively through” preferred stock); see also Steven N. Kaplan & Per 
Stromberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis 
of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 313 (2003). 
 46 Fried and Ganor report that: 
VCs’ liquidation preferences often far exceed the original purchase price of 
the stock: The liquidation preference of VC preferred stock sometimes confers 
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flow rights associated with VC-held preferred stock can look 
much more like debt than traditional equity.  
Another popular explanation for preferred stock’s 
prevalence in VC financing is that the Internal Revenue 
Service’s (IRS) method for taxing employee stock compensation 
confers certain advantages on preferred stock. In short, when a 
company grants stock to an employee, the IRS attempts to tax 
the value of the stock on the grant date as income.47 If VCs were 
to invest in the company via common stock, the IRS would 
suddenly have a benchmark for valuation—namely, the 
amount paid by the VCs. Preferred stock, on the other hand 
does not provide such a benchmark for valuing the common 
stock because it consists of a different bundle of rights.48 As a 
result, the company (and its employees) can report a lowball 
value for the common stock, on the ground that the preferred 
stock’s preferences make it much more valuable. Given the 
difficulty of valuing startup firms, the IRS will not find it easy 
to challenge such valuations. The upshot is that the use of 
preferred stock allows startups to reduce the effective tax 
burden on employees, and thus the pretax cost of compensation 
for the firm.49 This explanation is bolstered by the fact that VC 
investment through common stock is far more prevalent in 
other countries, such as Canada, that have different tax rules 
governing stock compensation.50  
  
the right to be paid a multiple of the purchase price before common 
shareholders may receive any payment. Depending on the circumstances, 
these multiples can be quite high, as much as six times the original purchase 
price or higher.  
Fried & Ganor, supra note 2 at 982; see also Richard A. Mann et al., Starting from 
Scratch: A Lawyer’s Guide to Representing a Startup Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773, 
860 (2004). Liquidation prices as high as twelve times the original investment amount 
are not unheard of. See Vyvyan Tenorio, VCs Reconsider Tough Terms for 
Entrepreneurs, DAILY DEAL (Jan. 28, 2002), http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-
1G1-82299621/vcs-reconsider-tough-terms.html. Where cumulative dividends are in 
arrears, of course, the amount that needs to be paid to the preferred before the common 
receives anything will be even larger. See Michael Woronoff & Jonathan Rosen, Effective 
vs. Nominal Valuations in Venture Capital Investing, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 199 (2005). 
 47 See 26 U.S.C. § 83(a) (2006). 
 48 See Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital 
Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874 
(2003). Gilson and Schizer report that startups frequently value common stock for tax 
purposes at 10 percent of the price paid for the most recent issue of preferred stock. Id. 
at 900-01 n.86. 
 49 See Fried & Ganor, supra note 2, at 986. 
 50 See Douglas J. Cumming, Capital Structure in Venture Finance, 11 J. 
CORP. FIN. 550, 553-54 (2005) (finding that preferred stock is far less common in 
Canadian VC financing, employed in less than 20 percent of venture financing 
transactions). Cumming has found that even American VC firms are less likely to use 
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Whatever the reason, the question naturally arises: 
Why do VCs use preferred stock rather than debt? After all, a 
convertible bond could largely replicate the cash-flow rights of 
VC-held preferred,51 and it would confer the additional advantages 
of stronger priority in bankruptcy and the potential for tax-
deductible interest payments, in contrast to the fully taxed 
dividend payments.52 VCs favor preferred because they tend to 
take an active role in the control and management of their 
portfolio companies, and American corporate law does not 
generally allow bondholders to take such a role.53 Indeed, 
bondholders who attempt to exercise control risk losing their 
contractual preferences.54 
Preferred stock allows the VC to participate in—and 
even dominate—control of the startup, to negotiate for and 
receive special preferences and protections, and to receive 
potentially substantial tax benefits, resulting in lower 
compensation costs.  
II. CONFLICTS BETWEEN COMMON AND PREFERRED 
STOCKHOLDERS 
As described in Part I, preferred stock would seem to 
offer every advantage for VCs. The dark lining of this silver 
cloud, however, is that the use of preferred stock creates 
serious conflicts of interest between the common and the 
preferred.55 While a given capital structure might be 
  
preferred stock when investing in Canadian startups. Douglas J. Cumming, United 
States Venture Capital Financial Contracting: Foreign Securities, 12 ADV. FIN. ECON. 
405, 408 (2007). 
 51 See Bratton, Downside, supra note 2, at 914-15 (“[T]he periodic payment 
properties of noncumulative convertible preferred can be mimicked in part with a 
convertible income bond.”). 
 52 Id. at 915. 
 53 See id. 
 54 The classic cases of creditors being held personally liable after exercising 
control are Martin v. Peyton, 158 N.E. 77, 80 (N.Y. 1927), which involved a loan to a 
partnership, and A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 288, 292-93 
(Minn. 1981), which involved a revolving line of credit to a corporation; see also Bratton, 
Downside, supra note 2, at 915 (“A debtholder who exercises control power . . . loses its 
limited liability status, and could be personally liable to other creditors of the firm or even 
to [the entrepreneur] in the event its management decisions work out badly.”). 
 55 This conflict between the preferred and the common is, for the most part, 
what Lawrence Mitchell has described as a “horizontal” conflict—conflict between 
different classes of shareholders—rather than a “vertical” conflict—conflict between the 
shareholders and interested directors and managers. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The 
Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1190 (1990); 
Mitchell, supra note 2, at 449-50. With more than one legitimate interest at stake, such 
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advantageous for all of the players overall, the actual 
distribution of money at a particular time will always represent 
a clash of interests. When push comes to shove, any preference 
granted to the preferred stockholders must necessarily come at 
the expense of the common stockholders.56 Where the common 
stockholders control the company—which has generally been 
the case, historically—this conflict creates a substantial risk of 
exploitation of preferred stockholders. 
This exploitation can take a number of forms, but it 
tends to be directed toward the same end: elimination of dividend 
arrearages. Where the corporation has, due to straitened 
circumstances, been unable to pay the required preferred 
dividends for a substantial period, the large accumulated 
arrearages can present an obstacle to common shareholders’ 
ability to receive a return when corporate performance 
eventually improves.57 The temptation for management—who 
are elected by the common stock and often hold substantial 
quantities of common stock themselves—is to find ways to 
eliminate preferred arrearages to clear the way for paying 
dividends to the common or raising new equity capital.58 
Arrearages can be eliminated in a number of ways, the 
simplest being an amendment to the certificate of 
  
“horizontal” conflicts tend not to be as amenable to resolution via the traditional 
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. 
 56 See Mitchell, supra note 2, at 446 (The preferreds’ “advantages, of course, 
come at the expense of the common stockholders, for the distribution of corporate 
wealth at any given point in time is zero sum. Whatever the size of the pie, and 
however much it grows, whatever one gets is, by definition, unavailable to the other. 
Thus, to the extent of their preferences, preferred and common stockholders are in 
direct conflict with one another.”). 
 57 Such a situation was extremely common after the Great Depression. See 
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 8 (“As more arrearages cumulate, the issuer’s 
equity capital structure becomes more and more dysfunctional, with the lion’s share of 
the marginal economic interest appended to the preferred even as the votes for the 
board of directors stay appended to the common. Preferred rights look more and more 
like barriers on the road to progress for the enterprise as a whole. During the Great 
Depression the corporate landscape was crowded with such capital structures.”); 
Stamler, supra note 2, at 1336-37 (“Dividend arrearage elimination became widespread 
after the Great Depression . . . . Unpaid dividends on preferred stock would accrue and 
had to be paid in full before the corporation could declare a dividend on its common 
stock. Thus, when corporations became profitable following the Depression, 
management could not declare common stock dividends before it paid the often sizeable 
preferred stock arrearages which had accrued.”). 
 58 See Brudney, supra note 2, at 450 (“[A]t the first sign of a revival of 
earnings, the common stock—to which management is considerably more responsive 
than it is to preferred—desires to participate. In order to do so, it must eliminate the 
barrier to the flow of earnings to itself, the accumulation of arrearages.”). 
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incorporation, cancelling them.59 Similarly, the board could force 
a “voluntary” exchange of old preferred stock for a new preferred 
issuance without the arrearages.60 One might wonder why the 
preferred stockholders would ever agree to an amendment that 
strips arrearages, or to a disadvantageous exchange, when such 
proposals usually require approval of the preferred by a class 
vote.61 Yet, historically, preferred stockholders have agreed to 
allow arrearages to be eliminated with surprising frequency.62 In 
some cases, this may simply be because the preferred 
stockholders also own common shares. However, this seeming 
willingness of the preferred to act against their own interests 
has traditionally been ascribed to the preferred stockholders’ 
“bargaining disadvantages in dealing with the common 
stockholders—disadvantages of economic position and of 
political posture which enabled the commons to dominate the 
bargaining and effectively to determine the result.”63 
  
 59 See, e.g., W. Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 85 N.E.2d 722, 729 (Ill. 1949); O’Brien 
v. Socony Mobile Oil Co., 152 S.E.2d 278, 279 (Va. 1967); Stamler, supra note 2, at 
1337-38. 
 60 See, e.g., Johnson v. Fuller, 121 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1941); Barrett v. Denver 
Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1943), aff’d, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944); 
Johnson v. Lamprecht, 15 N.E.2d 127 (Ohio 1938); Stamler, supra note 2, at 1337; 
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 8. 
 61 See 7 SEC. & EXEC. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF 
THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND 
REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES app. B at 473-74 (1938) [hereinafter PROTECTIVE 
COMMITTEE STUDY]; Brudney, supra note 2, at 447. 
 62 See Brudney, supra note 2, at 448 (“Notwithstanding their formal power 
thus to block the alteration of their rights, experience has shown that with monotonous 
frequency the preferred stock as a class was induced to cast the necessary votes for 
what appear to be detrimental, and sometimes disastrous, consequences to itself, 
consequences for which no necessity was demonstrated.”); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Fair 
and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 HARV. L. REV. 780, 792 (1942) (“To obtain the 
cooperation of the preferred shareholders . . . is not as difficult as it would appear to be 
at first sight.”). 
 63 Brudney, supra note 2, at 448. The disadvantageous “economic position” 
Brudney refers to is that, traditionally, “[i]nvestors in preferred stock look for a 
continuous cash return” akin to the flow of interest payments to a bondholder, and that 
preferred stockholders have much more to gain from a resumption of dividend 
payments than from “an increment in the value of their stock from corporate 
reinvestment of the cash flow.” Id. at 460 n.40. This supposed need for continuous flow 
means that “[d]elay favors the juniors and disfavors the seniors,” thus allowing the 
common stockholders to credibly threaten to delay any dividend payments in order to 
extract concessions from the preferred. Id.  
  Among the other “bargaining disadvantages” identified by Brudney and 
other commentators are that preferred shareholders may be widely dispersed; may lack 
control over and access to the corporation’s proxy machinery; may be rationally 
ignorant, or at least at an informational disadvantage vis-à-vis the board. See 
PROTECTIVE COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 61; see also Brudney, supra note 2, at 448, 
459-60; Dodd, supra note 62; Stamler, supra note 2, at 338-39. Additionally, where the 
common control the board—as has traditionally been the case—the common can 
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The common stockholders can also strip arrearages by 
performing a “dummy” merger. In a dummy merger, the 
corporation simply creates a subsidiary to act as a shell 
company and then merges with it, leaving the former shell 
company as the surviving corporation. The merger agreement 
provides for the shares of the original company—including the 
preferred shares—to be converted into shares of the new 
company, sans arrearages.64 Importantly, this can often be 
accomplished without a class vote, at least in Delaware.65 As a 
result, if the common stockholders control a majority of the 
total votes, they will be able to unilaterally strip away 
arrearages in this fashion.66 Indeed, Delaware courts have 
explicitly blessed this mechanism, and, while hardly routine, it 
has been done on occasion in recent memory.67 
The problem of wholesale canceling of arrearages and 
other preferences via merger, however, is just a subset of a 
larger category of problems: the allocation of merger proceeds 
between the common stockholders and the preferred 
stockholders.68 Such an allocation represents a zero-sum game, 
where the interests of the common and preferred are 
intractably in conflict. This conflict becomes especially acute 
  
essentially hold the company’s performance hostage as a means for extracting 
concessions from the preferred. See Dodd, supra note 62, at 793. 
  Of course, one should not neglect the possibility that the preferred could be 
simply acting in their own best interests in allowing, for example, cancellation of 
arrearages. Where the existence of large arrearages prevents a needed recapitalization, 
the preferreds’ choice may be between canceling preferences to salvage some value, or 
retaining their privileges at the cost of killing the company—thus assuring no return. 
See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 12.  
 64 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 12; Stamler, supra note 2, at 1352; 
Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 300.  
 65 See Dalton v. Am. Inv. Co., 490 A.2d 574, 578 (Del. Ch. 1985) (rejection of a 
merger plan by preferred stockholders is insufficient to block the merger because “all 
shares [are] accorded an equal vote.”); PROTECTIVE COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 61, 
at app. B at 535 (“[E]ven the right to vote on a proposed merger or consolidation plan 
may afford but slight protection to small classes of stock, if class voting is not required. 
Most of the statutes providing for merger or consolidation, however, fail to include such 
a requirement.”); Stamler, supra note 2, at 1352; Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 
12. Bratton and Wachter, however, cite MBCA § 11.04(f) and note that many states 
have “merger statutes that carry over a class vote in the merger [context] by reference 
to the fact that it would obtain given a charter amendment.” Bratton & Wachter, supra 
note 2, at 13 n.40. 
 66 Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 293 (“Straight voting of preferred and common 
stock [is] no protection; numerically the common is usually greater.”). 
 67 See e.g., Elliot Assocs. L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843 (Del. 1998); Fed. 
United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940); Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 32 
A.2d 148 (Del. Ch. 1943); Donohue v. Heuser, 239 S.W.2d 238 (Ky. 1951); Bove v. Cmty. 
Hotel Corp., 249 A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969). 
 68 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 15-16. 
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where the total merger consideration is greater than the 
corporation’s market capitalization but less than the total 
amount of the preferred stockholders’ liquidation preferences 
and dividend arrearages.69 
Another recurring dispute—and the subject of one of the 
recent Delaware cases discussed below—is the enforcement of 
mandatory payments to the preferred. While preferred 
dividends are generally discretionary, situations often arise 
where the preferred stockholders seek to make dividend 
payments or redemption of preferred stock mandatory.70 When 
the common stockholders control the board, though, enforcing 
even a “mandatory” payment can be difficult. This problem is 
especially salient in the VC context, where mandatory payment 
rights may be included as downside protection for the VCs as a 
way to salvage the remains of an unsuccessful investment. 
The final important type of conflict represents the flip-
side of those introduced thus far. It is entirely possible—and 
may even be likely in VC-financed corporations—that the 
preferred stockholders will control the board. In general, 
preferred stockholders—as the owners of senior securities—will 
have different incentives from the common. When they have 
control of the board, these incentives will encourage them to 
choose a course of action that disadvantages the common.71 In 
these instances, what protections should the common 
stockholders have against fundamental changes—including 
mergers, liquidations, and asset sales—initiated by controlling 
preferred stockholders?72  
  
 69 Bratton & Wachter give the example of a $140 million offer to a 
corporation with a market valuation of $100 million—$80 million in preferred shares 
and $20 million in common—but where the preferreds’ liquidation preferences and 
arrearages total $150 million. How should the $40 million gain from the merger be 
allocated? All to the preferred? All to the common? Somewhere in between? What is to 
prevent the common from simply taking the whole $140 million? Id. 
 70 See id. at 37. 
 71 In particular, there is reason to believe that preferred shareholders, who 
are generally not the true residual claimant on the upside, will tend to be more risk-
averse than the common. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 2, at 993-94 (“[P]referred-
owning VCs in control of the board may, in certain situations, make excessively 
conservative business decisions, such as choosing immediate ‘liquidity events’ (major 
corporate transactions that would end the independent life of the company, such as 
dissolution or a sale of the business) over higher-value strategies involving more risk. 
The costs of this value-reducing behavior are borne, in the first instance, by the 
common shareholders.”). 
 72 See Orban v. Field, No. 12820, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48, at *26-33 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 1, 1997). 
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III. LEGAL TREATMENT OF PREFERRED STOCKHOLDERS 
A. Delaware Law 
In 1973, Victor Brudney lamented that, “in deference to 
the ideology of free bargaining among groups of corporate 
security holders and to some felt need for flexibility,” courts 
had largely abandoned any serious attempt to use fiduciary 
duties to protect preferred stockholders from disadvantageous 
treatment at the hands of the common.73 In addition to 
“ideology,” Brudney also recognized the difficulty of fashioning 
workable standards of “fairness,” and attempted to develop a 
standard that would prove usable.74 Two decades later, little 
had changed when Lawrence Mitchell argued that “the position 
of the preferred stockholder in the corporate firmament, 
fiduciary rhetoric notwithstanding, is more vulnerable than 
any other participant.”75 Now, nearly twenty years after 
Mitchell wrote, the law has yet to develop in a way that would 
ease the anxiety of those who fret over preferred stockholders’ 
legal lot. If anything, courts have—correctly, as I will argue—
become even less willing to provide preferred stockholders any 
rights or protections they have failed to unambiguously provide 
themselves by contract.76 
  
 73 Brudney, supra note 2, at 446-47. 
 74 Brudney’s proposed solution was, in essence, to treat preferred stock 
arrearages “as if” they were matured claims whenever the common moved to cancel or 
otherwise vitiate them. These matured rights would then be treated, as much as 
possible, like matured rights in an insolvency proceeding. In particular, Brudney would 
require whatever new participation the preferred were offered in the recapitalization to 
be equal in investment value to the amount of the cancelled arrearages. Thus, writes 
Brudney,  
in a case in which preferred arrears totaling $65 are being amended out of 
existence and the preferreds are receiving additional, new participations in 
exchange for giving up the arrearages, the measure of their claim would be 
$65, and the fairness of the particular plan would be assessed by comparing 
the dollar amount of the arrearages with the investment value of the 
securities given in exchange for cancelling the arrearages.  
Id. at 465. As is explored below, this overly rigid conception of fairness would be likely 
to work significant mischief.  
 75 Mitchell, supra note 2, at 443-44; see also Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, 
at 65 (“Any apparent inconsistency [in Delaware law] is dispelled by reference to the 
results—the preferred always loses.”). 
 76 Bratton complains that “preferred’s legal position deteriorated markedly 
over the course of the twentieth century . . . [today’s] preferred holders have to rely on 
the literal terms of their contracts to protect against issuer opportunism.” Bratton, 
Downside, supra note 2, at 925. I shall argue, however, that this is actually a positive 
development. 
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Courts have consistently described preferred stock as 
“stock,” naturally enough, conferring on stockholders an 
ownership interest in the firm.77 As a result, courts have 
traditionally paid at least lip-service to the idea that preferred 
stockholders are a corporate constituency to whom the 
corporation’s managers and directors owe fiduciary duties.78 
Given the frequency of conflict between the interests of the 
common and the preferred stockholders, however,79 the notion 
of fiduciary duties owed to preferred stockholders threatens to 
create a perpetual condition of divided duty. 
Courts, at least in Delaware,80 have attempted to square 
this circle by treating only those features of preferred stock 
that are shared with the common as truly “corporate” in 
nature, while the preferences—the very features of preferred 
stock that define it as “preferred”—are treated as purely 
contractual in nature. The classic expression of this doctrinal 
construction is found in the 1986 case of Jedwab v. MGM Grand 
Hotels, Inc.,81 where Chancellor Allen stated the following: 
[W]ith respect to matters relating to preferences or limitations that 
distinguish preferred stock from common, the duty of the corporation 
and its directors is essentially contractual and the scope of the duty 
is appropriately defined by reference to the specific words evidencing 
that contract; where however the right asserted is not to a preference as 
against the common stock but rather a right shared equally with the 
common, the existence of such a right and the scope of the correlative 
duty may be measured by equitable as well as legal standards.82 
The result is, in theory, that “[p]reference rights are 
contractual; ordinary stock rights are fiduciary.”83 In practice, 
  
 77 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (West 2013); In re Hawkeye Oil Co., 19 
F.2d 151, 152 (D. Del. 1927) (stating that holders of preferred are to be treated as 
stockholders, not creditors); see also Mitchell, supra note 2, at 445 (“Preferred stock is, 
of course, stock . . . . [T]he most significant consequence of this apparent tautology is 
that preferred stockholders, like common stockholders, are traditionally regarded as 
having an ownership interest in the corporation.”). 
 78 See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Chi. Milwaukee R.R. Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1062 
(Del. Ch. 1987). 
 79 See supra Part II.  
 80 As elsewhere in corporate law, Delaware is where the action is. Bratton & 
Wachter, supra note 2, at 5 (“The Delaware courts have emerged in the dominant role 
as deciders of preferred stock disputes.”). Since 2000, Bratton and Wachter find that 
“sixty percent of the cases keyed by West as involving preferred stock . . . were decided in 
Delaware.” Id. at 5 n.13. New York is a distant second in terms of numbers of cases. Id. 
 81 509 A.2d 584 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
 82 Id. at 594. 
 83 Mitchell, supra note 2, at 448; see also Bratton, Downside, supra note 2, at 
929-30 (“Under Delaware law, the preferred share the role of fiduciary beneficiary with 
the common only with respect to elements of preferred participation constituting an 
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however, two factors combine to ensure that preferred 
stockholders virtually always lose litigated disputes. 
1. Common-Controlled Boards 
In instances where common stockholders control the 
board, and where preferred stockholders’ rights coincide with 
the rights of the common, no horizontal conflict of interest will 
exist between the preferred and the common stockholders. 
While the preferred stockholders could theoretically bring a 
derivative claim alleging director self-dealing or generic 
negligent mismanagement, such a claim would necessarily be 
available to the common stockholders, as well. The preferred 
would be adequately protected either by the board’s desire to 
serve the interests of the common stockholders, or by the common 
stockholders’ ability to call upon their own fiduciary protections. 
As a result, any fiduciary protections for the preferred 
stockholders are largely superfluous where the interests of the 
common and the preferred stockholders are identical.84  
It is where a horizontal dispute exists—where the 
interests of the preferred and the common diverge—that 
fiduciary duties might at least potentially serve to protect the 
preferred against opportunism by the common stockholders. 
And it is here that Delaware withholds the protections of 
fiduciary duties and requires the preferred stockholders to look 
to the terms of their contract. Furthermore, as we will see 
below, the courts tend to interpret the terms of the preferred 
stockholders’ contract narrowly.85 The result is that “Delaware 
  
equity participation identical to that of the common. Accordingly, the preferred have a 
cause of action along with the common where management engages in self-dealing 
transactions or negligently mismanages the firm. In contrast, where a preferred claim 
arises from rights and preferences not shared with the common, the Delaware courts 
characterize the claim as contractual rather than fiduciary.”). 
 84 See Mitchell, supra note 2, at 449 (arguing that under Jedwab, “preferred 
stockholders are in no better position than creditors who incidentally have the right to 
bring derivative litigation, which generally will be of little benefit to them”). 
 85 See Bratton, Downside, supra note 2, at 930 (citing Kaiser Aluminum Corp. 
v. Matheson, 681 A.2d 392 (Del. 1996), and employing the maxim of interpretation 
contra proferentum against the preferred); Warner Commc’ns Inc. v. Chris-Craft 
Indus., Inc., 583 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1989) (rejecting a literal interpretation of the 
contract that would protect the preferred). Bratton and Wachter seem to suggest that 
this tendency to interpret preferred stock contractual language strictly against the 
preferred stems, at least in part, from the Delaware courts’ traditional deference to 
boards of directors, turning—perhaps inappropriately, in their view—a question of 
contractual interpretation into one of business judgment. See Bratton & Wachter, 
supra note 2, at 4. 
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law holds out no serious promise of fiduciary protections 
against issuer opportunism for preferred stockholders.”86  
Moreover, Delaware courts have suggested that under 
some circumstances, for a board to give the preferred 
stockholders more consideration than required by contract 
would itself constitute a breach of fiduciary duty to the common 
stockholders.87 The courts have occasionally cautioned common-
controlled boards on the need to treat all classes “fairly” in 
zero-sum transactions,88 but one searches in vain for a merger 
or other fundamental transaction that has been blocked for 
“unfairness” to the preferred, where no explicit contractual 
protection is traduced. Indeed, as will be developed more fully 
below, it is difficult to see how a court dedicated to a norm of 
common-stock value maximization and viewing the preferred 
stockholders’ rights as contractual could find a basis to deem a 
transaction “unfair” in the absence of a breach of contract. 
2. Preferred-Controlled Boards 
Under Delaware law, the situation is somewhat 
different when the preferred stockholders control the board. 
The conflict of interest between common and preferred 
stockholders, of course, remains.89 Delaware courts have 
struggled, however, in attempting to apply fiduciary duties in 
this situation. On the one hand, requiring a preferred-
controlled board to favor the common stockholders would 
  
 86 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 4; see also Mitchell, supra note 2, 
at 449 (“[T]o say that preferred stockholders have any meaningful fiduciary rights 
borders on the fraudulent.”). 
 87 In Equity-Linked Inv., L.P. v. Adams, for example, the court noted that 
“[t]he special protections offered to the preferred are contractual in 
nature . . . . [G]enerally it will be the duty of the board, where discretionary 
judgment is to be exercised, to prefer the interests of common stock—as the good 
faith judgment of the board sees them to be—to the interests created by the 
special rights, preferences, etc., of preferred stock, where there is a conflict.”  
705 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Del. Ch. 1997). Fried and Ganor note that this is “consistent with 
a long line of Delaware cases holding that boards controlled by common shareholders 
can take steps that jeopardize preferred shareholders’ economic interests as long as 
they adhere to the contractual provisions bargained for by the preferred shareholders.” 
Fried & Ganor, supra note 2, at 979. 
 88 See In re FLS Holdings, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 12623, 1993 WL 
104562, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 2, 1993, revised Apr. 21, 1993) (requiring “fair” treatment 
of preferred shareholders in a merger context). 
 89 See, e.g., Baird & Henderson, supra note 2, at 1330-31 (“A board that acts 
on behalf of a senior investor will tend to play it safe. Directors will resist taking on 
new projects or even agreeing to keep the firm operational, as they enjoy none of the 
upside and suffer the consequences if things go badly.”). 
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largely defeat the purpose of the preferred stockholders using 
control as a protection in the first place, and would threaten to 
destabilize bargains involving the possibility of the preferred 
stockholders taking control of the board. On the other hand, 
allowing the board to favor the preferred stockholders would 
leave the common stockholders at risk of exploitation—far 
more exposed than preferred stockholders are to exploitation 
by controlling common stockholders, as the common will almost 
always lack the extensive contractual protections typically 
possessed by the preferred. 
Recognizing this tension, in the case of Orban v. Field, 
the Delaware Chancery Court allowed controlling preferred 
stockholders to use corporate resources to arrange a merger 
that, while in the best interests of the corporation as a whole, 
resulted in the common shareholders being wiped out.90 Thus, 
Orban suggests that controlling preferred stockholders may 
favor themselves over the common, without an obligation to 
maximize the value of the common stock.91 Orban also suggests, 
however, that the common shareholders could challenge the 
merger by showing that it was not in the “best interests of the 
corporation.”92 Unlike controlling common, then, a preferred-
controlled board acting to benefit the preferred at the expense 
of the common may be required to show the fairness of the 
challenged transaction “to the corporation as a whole.”93  
The net result is a control-contingent standard where 
the form of legal scrutiny depends on whether the common 
stockholders or the preferred stockholders control the board. 
Common-controlled boards are unequivocally permitted to 
  
 90 Orban v. Field, No. 12820, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48, at *29-32 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 1, 1997). 
 91 See id. at *29; Baird & Henderson, supra note 2, at 1332 (“Orban seems to 
stand for the proposition that directors can take actions that are in the best interests of 
the corporation as a whole even when they take actions that are manifestly self-
interested or favor non-fiduciaries over fiduciaries.”); Matthew P. Quilter et al., Duties 
of Directors: Venture Capital Board Representatives and Conflicts of Interest, in 
VENTURE CAPITAL 2002, at 1117-18 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice, Course Handbook Series 
No. B-1312, 2002). Fried and Ganor suggest that “Orban is read by sophisticated 
lawyers in Silicon Valley” to stand for the proposition that “a preferred-controlled 
board does not owe a fiduciary duty specifically to the common shareholders and that it 
has wide discretion to benefit the preferred shareholders instead.” Fried & Ganor, 
supra note 2, at 992 n.82. 
 92 Orban, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS, at *26 n.23. 
 93 Id.; see also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) 
(requiring a showing of entire fairness to the corporation); Baird & Henderson, supra 
note 2, at 1332 (“[T]o take advantage of this rule, the directors may be forced to show 
the ‘entire fairness’ of the transaction to the corporation as a whole.”). 
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exercise their discretion to favor the common stockholders over 
the preferred, subject only to whatever contractual protections 
the preferred have secured in advance (although even those are 
interpreted narrowly). At the same time, preferred-controlled 
boards may only favor the preferred over the common if such 
actions can be shown to be in the best interests of the 
corporation as a whole.94 
B. Delaware Law Applied: A Trio of Recent Cases 
A trio of recent Delaware cases displays the struggle 
courts undergo when trying to apply these principles in various 
circumstances. These cases are introduced here and will be 
reexamined below to demonstrate how the analysis in Parts IV 
and V could be applied in actual cases. In the first, In re Trados 
Inc. Shareholder Litigation,95 Chancellor Chandler made clear 
that controlling preferred stockholders owe fiduciary duties to 
the common, though he suggested that those duties could be 
circumscribed or even overcome by contract. The second, LC 
Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James,96 demonstrates the 
narrowness of the fiduciary protections to which noncontrolling 
preferred stockholders are entitled, with Chancellor Strine 
allowing even an ambiguous contractual scheme to displace 
fiduciary review. Finally, in SV Investment Partners, LLC v. 
ThoughtWorks, Inc.,97 Vice Chancellor Laster interpreted the 
preferred stockholders’ seemingly clear contractual protection 
in a way that left them at the mercy of the common-controlled 
board’s discretion. 
1. In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation 
The first of the three cases featured a stark conflict of 
interest between the preferred stockholders—who controlled 
the board—and the common stockholders. The preferred 
stockholders sought to cut their losses and exit by selling the 
  
 94 See Fried & Ganor, supra note 2, at 992-93 (“The identity of those 
controlling the board affects the content of the board’s duties. A common-controlled 
board is free to serve the interests of the common shareholders at the expense of the 
preferred shareholders and aggregate shareholder value. In contrast, a preferred-
controlled board can make business decisions that serve the preferred at the expense of 
common, as long as those decisions can be defended as in the best interests of the 
corporation.”). 
 95 No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009). 
 96 990 A.2d 435 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 97 7 A.3d 973 (2010). 
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company, even at the cost of wiping out the common stock, while 
the common stockholders had little to lose—and potentially much 
to gain—from continuing the effort to turn the company around 
without a sale. In re Trados98 involved a “software and services” 
company, Trados, that had accepted venture capital investment 
in the hopes of better positioning itself for an IPO.99 As it 
happened, the first round of investment occurred at the tail end of 
the tech bubble in early 2000.100 When the bubble burst, the 
company’s prospects for a successful public offering dimmed, and 
after four years of failed efforts—and the issuance of five series of 
preferred stock—the VCs began pursuing exit from their 
investment through a sale of the company.101  
The VCs had gone to great lengths to protect their 
interests. In addition to a large liquidation preference—which 
also applied in the event of a transfer of control, and which 
totaled $57.9 million by the time the company was ultimately 
sold—the multiple issues of preferred stock had also given the 
VCs control of the board.102 By 2004, the “preferred stockholders 
had a total of four designees on Trados’ seven member board,” 
with two of the remaining seats held by Trados officers, and the 
final seat held by an outside, independent director.103 
In April 2004, the VCs started to actively seek potential 
buyers of the company.104 The board retained an investment 
bank to identify plausible candidates and contacted seven 
potential suitors.105 It received an offer of $40 million, which it 
rejected as too low. In an attempt to motivate top executives to 
improve the company’s performance and place it in a more 
marketable condition, the board instituted an incentive plan, 
“which set a graduated compensation scale for the Company’s 
management based on the price obtained for the Company in 
an acquisition.”106 These incentives worked; the company’s 
performance improved, and the company ultimately attracted a 
merger offer of $60 million.107 Under the terms of the merger 
agreement, management received approximately $7.8 million 
  
 98 No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009). 
 99 Id. at *1. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See id. at *2; Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 51. 
 102 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 51. 
 103 In re Trados, 2009 WL 2225958, at *1-2. 
 104 Id. at *2. 
 105 Id. at *3. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at *3-4. 
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pursuant to the incentive plan, while “the remainder would go to 
the preferred stockholders in partial satisfaction of their $57.9 
million liquidation preference.”108 The common stockholders were 
left with nothing. 
In fact, the management incentive plan had worked 
perhaps too well. A common stockholder brought a suit for breach 
of fiduciary duty, arguing that the company’s performance had 
improved to the point where a merger had become unnecessary.109 
Had the board merely waited, there was at least a chance that the 
company’s improved performance would eventually create a 
return for the common stockholders.110 The conflicts of interest 
here were clear;111 continued operations offered the preferred 
stockholders little upside and a potentially large downside, while it 
offered the common stockholders little downside and a potentially 
large upside. The merger enabled the preferred stockholders to 
recoup around 90 percent of their liquidation preference 
(approximately $52 million out of $57.9 million) and exit their 
investment.112 The common stockholders received nothing, and they 
lost any chance of ever receiving anything.113 
The plaintiff argued that the board had violated its 
fiduciary duties by “never consider[ing] the interest of the 
common stockholders as a going concern, even though they 
were obliged to give priority to that interest over the preferred 
stockholders’ interest in exiting their investment.”114 In short, 
the plaintiff argued that the board had a fiduciary duty to favor 
the interests of the common over the interests of the preferred. 
Chancellor Chandler denied the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss. First, he characterized the case as involving a conflict 
of interest between the preferred and the common. The key 
passage, citing both Jedwab and Equity-Linked Investors, 
stated: 
Generally, the rights and preferences of preferred stock are 
contractual in nature. This Court has held that directors owe 
  
 108 Id. at *4. 
 109 Id. at *3. 
 110 Id. at *6. 
 111 As the court noted, “[p]laintiff’s theory of the case is based on the 
proposition that, for purposes of the merger, the preferred stockholders’ interests 
diverged from the interests of the common stockholders.” Id. at *7. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. (“It would not stretch reason to say that [the merger] is the worst 
possible outcome for the common stockholders. The common stockholders would 
certainly be no worse off had the merger not occurred.”). 
 114 Id. at *6. 
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fiduciary duties to preferred stockholders as well as common 
stockholders where the right claimed by the preferred “is not to a 
preference as against the common stock but rather a right shared 
equally with the common.” Where this is not the case, however, 
“generally it will be the duty of the board, where discretionary 
judgment is to be exercised, to prefer the interests of common 
stock—as the good faith judgment of the board sees them to be—to 
the interests created by the special rights, preferences, etc., of 
preferred stock, where there is a conflict.” Thus, in circumstances 
where the interests of the common stockholders diverge from those 
of the preferred stockholders, it is possible that a director could 
breach her duty by improperly favoring the interests of the preferred 
stockholders over those of the common stockholders.115  
The conflict between the interests of the preferred and the 
common was clear in this situation. Chancellor Chandler thus 
held that the plaintiff could avoid dismissal by pleading facts 
“that demonstrate that the director defendants were interested 
or lacked independence with respect to” the decision to enter 
into the merger.116  
Chandler went on to find that lack of independence was 
sufficiently demonstrated—“under the plaintiff-friendly pleading 
standard on a motion to dismiss”—by the fact that four of the 
seven board members were designated by, and had substantial 
relationships with, the preferred stockholders.117 As a result, the 
duty of loyalty was implicated, the business judgment rule no 
longer applied, and—as in Orban—the burden shifted to the 
defendants to establish that the board acted fairly, thus 
precluding dismissal.118 
This result makes clear that a preferred-controlled 
board owes fiduciary duties to the common.119 Actions by a 
preferred-controlled board favoring the interests of the 
preferred over the common are subject to treatment as 
interested director transactions, implicating the duty of loyalty 
  
 115 Id. at *7 (footnotes omitted) (citing Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 
509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986); Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 
1040, 1042 (Del. Ch. 1997)). 
 116 Id. at *6. 
 117 Id. at *8. 
 118 Id. at *8-9. 
 119 The case makes equally clear that a board owes no such noncontractual 
fiduciary duties to the preferred, where the interests of the preferred diverge from 
those of the common. Chancellor Chandler goes so far as to suggest that with regards 
to preferences—such as the liquidation preference implicated in the case—the board 
owes no more fiduciary duties to preferred stockholders than they do to creditors. See id. at 
*7 n.42 (rejecting the defendants’ argument that a case involving creditors was 
distinguishable because preferred stockholders, unlike creditors, are owed fiduciary duties). 
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and removing the protections of the business judgment rule.120 
It is important, however, not to miss a crucial proviso. The 
board must “prefer the interests of common stock” only “where 
discretionary judgment is to be exercised.”121 Chancellor 
Chandler was at pains to point out that the board had no 
contractual obligation to pursue a merger favorable to the 
preferred, nor did the preferred have a contractual right to 
force the sale of the company.122 Had the preferred bargained to 
create, contractually, such an obligation in the board, or such a 
power in themselves, the case would presumably have come out 
differently. 
2. LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James  
LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James123 represented 
the more traditional scenario, where controlling common 
stockholders were alleged to have taken advantage of the 
preferred. The preferred stock in James had been issued by 
QuadraMed Corporation at $25 per share, and was accompanied 
by a liquidation preference equal to the issue price, together 
with a substantial dividend preference.124 The preferred stock 
could be converted into common shares at a ratio determined 
by dividing the liquidation preference by a sliding conversion 
price, which was equal to $15.50 per share by the time of the 
  
 120 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 52 (“Restating, when preferred 
holders in control cause the corporation to enter into a transaction that realizes on 
their contractual preferences on the moderate downside, approval by controlled board 
members will be treated as a self-dealing transaction at the behest of a complaining 
common stockholder. The preferred’s rights get no recognition under fiduciary law 
because they are contractual; the interest of the common, in contrast, does get 
recognition.”). 
 121 In re Trados, 2009 WL 2225958, at *8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 122 Chancellor Chandler notes that “[d]efendants [did] not argue that the 
board had an obligation to the preferred stockholders to pursue a transaction that 
would trigger the large liquidation preference of the preferred stock.” Id. at *7 n.38. He 
goes on to point out that while it is “reasonable to infer that the preferred stockholders 
would benefit from a transaction that allowed them to exit the investment while also 
triggering their liquidation preference, [this was] something they did not have a 
contractual right to force the Company to do.” Id. Later in the opinion, Chandler again 
emphasized that “it does not appear that the preferred stockholders had any 
contractual right to force a transaction that would trigger their liquidation preference.” 
Id. at *7 n.42. 
 123 LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 124 See QuadraMed Corp., Certificate of the Designation, Preferences, and 
Rights of the Series Cumulative Mandatory Convertible Preferred Shares, Par Value $.01 
per Share, QuadraMed Corp. Form 8-K, filed June 17, 2004, Exhibit 3.1, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1018833/000119312504104592/dex31.htm 
(Certificate). 
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merger at issue in James.125 Thus, just before the merger, each 
share of preferred could be converted into 1.6129 shares of 
common.126 The preferred stockholders had no right to vote in 
board elections or on any potential merger.127 
In 2008, QuadraMed’s board began serious discussions 
of a merger with several potential purchasers.128 Although the 
Certificate explicitly provided that the preferred stockholders’ 
liquidation preference was not triggered by a merger, the 
preferred stockholders demanded that they receive their 
liquidation preference—$25 per share—in any merger.129 At 
least one bidder initially expressed a potential willingness to 
pay the liquidation price or leave the preferred outstanding, 
but as negotiations dragged on, the amounts on offer fell, for 
both common and preferred alike. The board created a Special 
Committee to negotiate any merger. After failing to get any 
potential merger partners to agree to leave the preferred 
outstanding, the Special Committee—with the approval of 
outside counsel—arranged for the preferred to receive an 
amount equal to what they would receive if they were to convert 
their preferred into common.130 The final merger agreement 
provided that the common would get $8.50 per share, and the 
preferred would get $13.71 per share (1.6129 times $8.50).131 
The preferred shareholders sued, arguing that their 
contractual preferences made the preferred substantially more 
valuable than the $13.71 they were receiving in the merger, 
and that the board’s failure to allocate more of the merger 
proceeds to the preferred stock represented a breach of 
fiduciary duty owed to the preferred stockholders.132 In 
  
 125 Id. at § 7(a). 
 126 James, 990 A.2d at 439. 
 127 Id. at 440. The Certificate provided a number of trip wires which, if 
triggered, would provide the preferred stockholders with voting rights, but none of the 
wires were triggered. Id.  
 128 Id. at 441. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 441-43. Indeed, outside counsel “said that the Board had to be 
careful about giving the preferred stockholders more unless there were special reasons 
for doing so.” Id. at 443. As the defendants argued, “[t]o have added a dollop of crème 
fraiche on top of the merger consideration to be offered to the preferred would itself, in 
these circumstances, have amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty” to the common. Id. 
at 446. 
 131 Id. at 439. 
 132 Id. at 438. Notably, the preferred did not bring a Revlon claim. “That is, 
the preferred stockholders [did] not challenge the overall adequacy of the Merger 
consideration. Rather, the preferred stockholders claim[ed] that they simply did not 
receive a big enough slice of the pie . . . .” Id. at 439. 
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particular, the preferred stockholders looked to Chancellor Allen’s 
admonition in Jedwab that “directors owe preferred stockholders a 
fiduciary duty to ‘exercise appropriate care in negotiating [a] 
proposed merger’ in order to ensure that preferred shareholders 
receive their ‘fair allocation of the proceeds of [a] merger.’”133 
Vice Chancellor Strine, however, rejected the QuadraMed 
preferred stockholders’ fiduciary duty claim, leaving an appraisal 
action as their only potential remedy.134 Vice Chancellor Strine 
noted that while the Certificate did not provide the preferred with 
the right to receive their liquidation preference in the event of a 
merger, it did provide the preferred with the right to convert their 
shares into common and subsequently be treated pari passu with 
the common.135 Vice Chancellor Strine then distinguished Jedwab 
by pointing out that, “[n]otable in [Jedwab] was the absence of 
any contractual provision such as the one that exists in this case,” 
which provided a contractual basis for allocating merger 
consideration.136 Vice Chancellor Strine summarized the holding 
as follows: 
When, by contract, the rights of the preferred in a particular 
transactional context are articulated, it is those rights that the board 
must honor. To the extent that the board does so, it need not go 
further and extend some unspecified fiduciary beneficence on the 
preferred at the expense of the common. When, however, . . . there is 
no objective contractual basis for treatment of the preferred, then 
the board must act as a gap-filling agency and do its best to fairly 
reconcile the competing interests of the common and preferred.137 
  
 133 Id. at 446 (quoting Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 
(Del. Ch. 1986)). 
 134 Id. at 439. 
 135 The court summarized the contractual entitlements of the preferred as such:  
[I]n a merger the preferred stockholders will receive either: 1) the 
consideration determined by the Board in a merger agreement; or 2) if the 
preferred choose, the right to convert their shares using the Conversion 
Formula into common shares and redeem the same consideration as the 
common stockholders. The bottom line right of the preferred stockholders in a 
merger, therefore, is not tied to its healthy liquidation preference or the 
company’s mandatory conversion stock price—it is simply the right to convert 
the shares into common stock at the Conversion Formula and then be treated 
pari passu with the common.  
Id. at 440-41 (internal citation omitted). 
 136 Id. at 446. 
 137 Id. at 448-49. Vice Chancellor Strine further explained the limited role of 
fiduciaries in this context, noting that where there is no contractual basis for allocating 
the merger proceeds,  
the only protection for the preferred is if the directors, as the backstop 
fiduciaries managing the corporation that sold them their shares, figure out a 
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The Court claimed that to require the board to give the 
preferred anything more than what the contract required 
would be to “give [the preferred] leverage that they did not 
fairly extract in the contractual bargain . . . a judicially 
imposed substitute for the voting rights and other contractual 
protections that they could have, but did not obtain in the 
context of a merger.”138 
Taken at face value, the result in James is a relatively 
straightforward application of Jedwab, perhaps made 
noteworthy by Vice Chancellor Strine’s use of Trados to 
suggest (in dicta) that giving the preferred anything more than 
absolutely required by the contract might itself constitute a 
breach of fiduciary duty owed to the common stockholders.139 
More broadly, though, James is also notable in allowing even 
an arguably incomplete and ambiguous contractual provision to 
preclude any kind of fiduciary review.  
Bratton and Wachter, for example, take issue with the 
court’s contention that the Certificate truly provides an 
objective measure of what the preferred stockholders should 
receive in the event of a merger, describing the court’s reading 
of “standard conversion provisions” as potentially 
“subversive.”140 As is discussed more fully below, however, even 
if it is true that the preferred stockholders in James did not 
expect the conversion provisions to govern their rights in a 
merger—expecting instead that their treatment in a merger 
would be dictated by fiduciary obligations of fair dealing—the 
fact remains that the conversion provision, as drafted, does 
provide a benchmark for allocating merger consideration 
between the preferred and the common stockholders that is not 
facially absurd. Furthermore, if the preferred stockholders 
  
fair way to fill the gap left by incomplete contracting. Otherwise, the 
preferred would be subject to entirely arbitrary treatment in the context of a 
merger. 
 Id. at 447. 
 138 Id. at 451; see also id. (The court posed the question: “Having had the 
chance to extract more and having only obtained the right to demand treatment under 
the Conversion Formula that operates to allocate any consideration in a merger 
between the preferred and the common on a basis the preferred assented to in the 
Certificate, why should the preferred have the right to ask the Board to give them 
more?”). 
 139 Id. at 447; see also Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 29 (characterizing 
James as suggesting that “fiduciary law, far from requiring the board to make a fair 
allocation, disables the board from doing so: the Court cautions that the duty to 
maximize for the common could lead to liability for a director who intervenes to protect 
the preferred.”). 
 140 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 31.  
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wanted to assure themselves of some other kind of treatment in 
a merger—even fiduciary treatment—they easily could have 
done so explicitly. Nonetheless, James vividly illustrates the 
high drafting burden on the preferred. If the door remains open 
to fiduciary protection where an incomplete contract utterly 
fails to address a topic, it is a narrow opening indeed. 
3. SV Investment Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc.  
ThoughtWorks141 provides a somewhat different example 
of the fine line preferred stockholders must walk in Delaware. 
Whereas the James court found that a rather ambiguous 
contractual provision precluded fiduciary scrutiny, the 
ThoughtWorks court refused to find that a seemingly clear 
contractual provision provided any meaningful protection. 
ThoughtWorks was another venture capital case involving 
dashed hopes from the dot-com bubble of the 1990s. The 
difficulties that arose in ThoughtWorks originated in part from 
ThoughtWorks’s business model. ThoughtWorks was founded 
in 1993 as an “information technology professional services 
firm that develops and delivers custom business software 
applications.”142 ThoughtWorks attempted to hire and retain 
superstar computer programmers,143 who would be hired by 
large businesses to create custom software within a relatively 
short timeframe.144  
The crucial aspect of ThoughtWorks’s business model 
was that it required very little in the way of physical or 
financial capital. ThoughtWorks, as a result, possessed few 
assets, and did not even have long-term contracts with 
customers to provide steady cash-flow that might be easily 
capitalized.145 Most of ThoughtWorks’s “assets” were simply the 
  
 141 SV Investment Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d 973 (2010). 
 142 Id. at 977. 
 143 Id. ThoughtWorks’ founder “fostered a ‘secret sauce culture’ that would 
appeal to the very best software developers” and “place[d] tremendous emphasis on 
recruiting elite professional and providing them with challenging and intellectually 
stimulating work.” Id. 
 144 Id. (“ThoughtWorks’ engagements are typically short-term. Although some 
clients have engaged ThoughtWorks on multiple occasions over the years, each 
engagement typically lasts three to six months, does not automatically renew, and is 
subject to cancellation on as little as fifteen-days’ notice. ThoughtWorkers arrive at the 
scene, solve the problem, and move on.”). 
 145 Id. 
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large amounts of human capital represented by its employees.146 
This human capital, however, was at best only loosely tied to 
ThoughtWorks. Indeed, the programming skills possessed by 
ThoughtWorks’s employees were highly transferable. As such, 
ThoughtWorks resembled other low-physical capital–high-
human capital businesses—such as a pure investment bank—
in that it could potentially have significant value as a going 
concern while having little or no liquidation value.147 
In 1999, however, with the dot-com bubble accelerating 
to its climax, concerns about downside protection and 
liquidation value were not at the forefront of investors’ minds 
during the rush to cash in on a potentially lucrative IPO.148 
Looking to position itself for an IPO, ThoughtWorks sought, 
and quickly found, VC financing from a firm called SVIP. 
ThoughtWorks ultimately issued $26.6 million worth of 
preferred stock to SVIP at a price of $8.95 per share, with both 
parties expecting to perform an IPO within a year or two.149 Not 
entirely neglecting the downside, SVIP received a mandatory 
redemption right—if SVIP was unable to exit its investment 
within five years, through an IPO or otherwise, SVIP could 
insist that ThoughtWorks buy back the preferred stock at a 
price equal to the purchase price plus any accrued dividends.150 
This seemingly powerful right for SVIP illustrates both the 
impressive bargaining power of a VC firm and—due to the fact 
that it did not actually work, as the later discussion will 
show—the unavoidable vulnerability of an investor in an early-
stage company. 
The mandatory redemption provision contained 
standard language allowing the redemption to be made “out of 
funds legally available therefor.”151 This phrase has typically 
  
 146 Id. (“The Company’s employees, known as ‘ThoughtWorkers,’ are its most 
valuable asset.”). 
 147 In the event of a liquidation (or even a merger), ThoughtWorks’ employees 
could potentially flee en masse, taking their valuable human capital with them. See 
OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995) (“For firm 1’s 
acquisition of firm 2 to make economic sense, there must be some source of firm 2 value over 
and above the workers’ human capital, i.e. some ‘glue’ holding firm 2’s workers in place.”). 
 148 ThoughtWorks, 7 A.3d at 978 (“As SVIP noted in its investment 
recommendation, ThoughtWorks ‘[c]ould be an early IPO in a market which has 
recently seen some extraordinary valuations.’”). 
 149 Id. at 978. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. In his influential article on preferred stock contractual technique, 
Buxbaum notes that “[t]he common corporate provision for dividends is that they may 
be paid ‘out of funds legally available therefor.’ This phrase equates the source of 
dividends to the applicable statutory provisions and leaves problems of definition to the 
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been regarded as creating the maximum possible requirement 
for redemption—if funds are legally allowed to be used for 
redemption, the corporation must so use them.152 Here, SVIP’s 
desire to create the strongest possible redemption obligation is 
evidenced by other clauses providing (1) that in determining 
the funds legally available for redemption, the company should 
use the “highest amount permissible under applicable law,” 
and (2) that, after a potential one-year grace period, the 
obligation to make redemptions would be “continuous,” such 
that any cash that became available would be required to be 
diverted toward redemptions.153 
Soon after SVIP secured these contractual rights, the 
dot-com bubble burst, the window for an IPO slammed shut, 
and the clock began to tick on the redemption provision. After 
initial squabbling over the grace period, SVIP demanded full 
redemption of its stock in August 2006, by which time the total 
redemption price totaled $45 million.154 Each quarter for the 
next four years, the ThoughtWorks board met and determined 
the amount of “funds legally available” for redemption 
payments.155 Although the company’s financial advisors 
consistently found that the company had substantial “net asset 
value,” and even nontrivial “cash availability,” the board 
consistently found that little or no funds were available for 
redemption. By the time of the Chancery Court’s opinion in 
2010, only $4.1 million in preferred stock had been redeemed.156  
In 2009, the board began seeking to finance the redemption 
through borrowing, and cast a wide net for potential lenders.157 
Given the intangible nature of ThoughtWorks’s assets, however, 
borrowing against assets was not a realistic option. ThoughtWorks 
did manage to get a commitment from a lender focused on the 
company’s cash flow to provide $25 million for redemption, but the 
  
latter . . . .” Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 250. Buxbaum speaks of dividends, but such 
provisions are equally applicable to redemption privileges. 
 152 Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 250 (“Usually the limit of the statute is the 
desired corporate limit; hence the popularity of ‘out of funds legally available.’”). 
 153 ThoughtWorks, 7 A.3d at 988. 
 154 Id. at 980. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 981. 
 157 Id. (“[A]n information memorandum . . . was sent to seventy financing 
sources. The seventeen who expressed interest and signed confidentiality agreements 
received additional information. Three sources provided nonbinding commitment 
letters. After due diligence, two lenders provided definitive term sheets.”). 
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deal was conditioned on SVIP agreeing to tender all its stock for 
this amount—something SVIP refused to do.158 
Desperately attempting to salvage its investment—and 
understandably frustrated by its inability to secure payment 
from what remained, after all, a nontrivial going concern—
SVIP sued to enforce the mandatory redemption privilege, 
which had by then ballooned to nearly $67 million. SVIP claimed 
that ThoughtWorks had more than adequate surplus under the 
legal capital rules159 to cover the redemption—SVIP’s expert 
estimated ThoughtWorks’s balance sheet surplus at $68 to $137 
million.160 As a result, SVIP argued that ThoughtWorks had 
“funds legally available” for a full redemption, and that SVIP 
was entitled to a judgment for the full $67 million. 
Vice Chancellor Laster rejected this argument, for the 
very basic reason that “funds legally available” is simply not 
equivalent to “balance sheet surplus,”161 and the existence of 
surplus does not necessarily imply the existence of “funds 
legally available” for redemption. While the lack of balance 
sheet surplus may be the most common reason for a lack of 
legally available funds,162 lack of surplus is not the only reason 
funds might not be available. Most obviously, even where 
surplus exists, a corporation may not divert funds to dividends 
or redemptions where doing so could render them insolvent or 
otherwise impair the rights of creditors.163 Moreover, a company 
may be insolvent on a cash-flow basis even where it has a 
  
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 976. Under § 160(a)(1) of the Delaware Code, “a corporation may use 
only its surplus for the purchase of shares of its own capital stock,” including the 
redemption of preferred stock. In re Int’l Radiator Co., 92 A. 255, 256 (Del. Ch. 1914). 
“Surplus” is defined by § 154 of the Delaware Code to be “the excess of net assets over 
the par value of the corporation’s issued stock,” while “[n]et assets means the amount 
by which total assets exceed total liabilities.” ThoughtWorks, 7 A.3d at 982 (quoting 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154, and Klang v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 702 A.2d 
150, 153 (Del. 1997)). 
 160 ThoughtWorks, 7 A.3d at 976, 982-83. 
 161 Id. at 983 (“Equating ‘funds legally available’ with ‘surplus’ performs all of 
the work in SVIP’s argument. With that move, SVIP converts a provision 
contemplating payment ‘for cash’ into a formula based on an incorporeal legalism. This 
is a fallacy.”). 
 162 See id. (“Because the existence of surplus under Section 160 most 
commonly constrains a corporation’s ability to pay dividends or redeem stock, ‘funds 
legally available’ is colloquially treated as if synonymous with ‘surplus.’ The two 
concepts, however, are not equivalent.”). 
 163 See id. at 985-86 (“Most significantly for the current case, the common law 
has long restricted a corporation from redeeming its shares when the corporation is 
insolvent or would be rendered insolvent by the redemption.”). 
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substantial balance sheet surplus.164 As the Court noted, SVIP’s 
valuation expert had not considered whether redeeming the 
preferred stock in a lump sum would impair ThoughtWorks’s 
obligations to creditors.165 
While the decision could have rested on this ground 
alone, Vice Chancellor Laster took the opportunity to make a 
more fundamental point about the “funds legally available” 
language—that funds may be legally available without being 
actually available. In other words, funds—cash—must be 
actually available and at hand before one can even ask whether 
it would be legal to use those funds—that cash—to finance a 
redemption.166 It may be commonplace for a corporation to have 
cash on hand that cannot legally be used for redemptions. It 
may, however, also sometimes be the case that a corporation 
could have a sizeable accounting surplus out of which dividends 
could legally be paid, in theory, yet lack access to ready cash as 
a practical matter.167 In some cases the corporation will be able 
to liquidate assets, or even distribute assets to shareholders 
directly as payment—for example, Vice Chancellor Laster 
referenced the famous example of “whiskey dividends”168—but 
such an approach has obvious drawbacks when the assets in 
question are computer programmers. 
Vice Chancellor Laster seemed determined to 
emphasize the futility of trying to invoke the “funds legally 
available” language as a magic wand, transforming a balance 
  
 164 Id. at 987 (“A corporation may be insolvent under Delaware law either when 
its liabilities exceed its assets, or when it is unable to pay its debts as they come due.”). 
 165 Id. at 989. 
 166 Id. at 988 (The term “[f]unds legally available . . . contemplates ‘funds’ (in 
the sense of cash) that are ‘available’ (in the sense of on hand or readily accessible 
through sales or borrowing) and can be deployed ‘legally’ for redemptions without 
violating Section 160 or other statutory or common law restrictions, including the 
requirement that the corporation be able to continue as a going concern and not be 
rendered insolvent by the distribution.”). 
 167 Id. at 984 (“A corporation easily could have ‘funds’ and yet find that they 
were not ‘legally available.’ A corporation also could lack ‘funds,’ yet have the legal 
capacity to pay dividends or make redemptions because it had large surplus.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 168 Id. During World War II, at least one distillery company paid dividends in 
warehouse receipts for whiskey. See Donahue v. Comm’r, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 530 (1952). 
More recently, it has become popular for incorporated vineyards to pay “wine 
dividends,” with shareholders having the option to receive bottles of wine in lieu of 
cash. See Vanessa O’Connell, Wine Investors Are Courted with Concerts, Winery Tours, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 1998), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB903908058517515500.html. 
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sheet entry into cold hard cash.169 Ultimately, ThoughtWorks was 
unable to transform its large balance sheet surplus into cash, 
either through selling assets or by borrowing. Furthermore, the 
nature of the business made it difficult or impossible to reduce 
costs and stockpile the cash necessary to finance a redemption. 
The major cost of ThoughtWorks’s business was compensation to 
the ThoughtWorkers. Cut this compensation, though, and the 
ThoughtWorkers skedaddle for greener pastures, taking the 
value of the business with them. The result is a Catch-22—so 
long as ThoughtWorks does not attempt to redeem the 
preferred, a large surplus exists, which is seemingly available 
and sufficient to redeem the preferred; but if ThoughtWorks 
attempts to redeem the preferred, the surplus no longer exists, 
even for the purposes of redeeming the shares.170 
The result of this standard contractual language is thus 
not a cut-and-dried analysis but rather an inquiry requiring 
business judgment by the board. Given Delaware law’s strong 
tradition of deferring to boards in matters of business judgment, 
it is unsurprising that the standard Vice Chancellor Laster 
enunciated for challenging the board’s decision is rather tough: 
[T]he plaintiff must prove that in determining the amount of funds 
legally available, the board acted in bad faith, relied on methods and 
data that were unreliable, or made a determination so far off the 
mark as to constitute actual or constructive fraud.171 
SVIP did not come close to meeting this standard.172 The 
net result is that the Chancery Court’s narrow contractual 
interpretation has rendered a venerable protective provision 
far less protective than had previously been thought. What was 
undoubtedly intended and expected to be a powerful and 
unequivocal contractual protection was transformed by the 
court into a question of business judgment for the board, 
shielded by the business judgment rule and thus, as a practical 
matter, beyond the reach of judicial scrutiny. 
  
 169 ThoughtWorks, 7 A.3d at 983 (“Rather than examining ThoughtWorks’ 
assets to determine whether it has ‘funds’ that are ‘available’ and can be used ‘legally’ 
for redemptions, SVIP seeks a judgment based on an accounting convention.”). 
 170 Vice Chancellor Laster chided SVIP’s valuation expert for “never 
consider[ing] how making an eight-figure redemption payment would affect 
ThoughtWorks’ ability to operate and achieve the projections on which her analyses 
relied. She had no thoughts on how ThoughtWorks might raise the funds for such a 
redemption payment.” Id. at 989.  
 171 Id. at 988. 
 172 The court found the procedure followed by the ThoughtWorks board to be 
“impeccable”—a “thorough investigation” assisted by “well-qualified experts.” Id. 
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C. Criticisms and Potential Alternatives to Delaware Law 
The general paucity of theoretical analysis of preferred 
stock in the legal literature has not meant that Delaware law 
has escaped criticism in this area. The overall thrust of the 
commentary has been that Delaware law is insufficiently 
protective of the rights of preferred stockholders; regardless of 
the reasoning courts follow, the one constant is that the 
preferred stockholders always lose. Earlier articles, in 
particular, decried the courts’ unwillingness to extend fiduciary 
protections to preferred stockholders.173 More recently, however, 
a broader spectrum of recommendations has emerged, ranging 
from a call to abandon the concept of fiduciary duties altogether 
and let preferred stockholders live or die entirely by their 
contracts,174 to a call for a nuanced analysis that treats 
preferred stockholders as straddling the line between corporate 
stakeholders and contractual counterparties.175 
One alternative to Delaware’s treatment of preferred 
stockholders would be to always impose fiduciary duties on 
boards with respect to the preferred. Of course, taken to its 
extreme—that is, requiring boards to favor the interests of 
preferred stockholders—this approach would leave the common 
stockholders in the same exposed position the preferred find 
themselves under today’s Delaware law, but without the 
contractual protections usually available to the preferred 
stockholders. Some standard is necessary for mediating the 
unavoidable conflicts of interest between the common and the 
preferred stockholders. One possible approach would be to 
abandon the modern notion of fiduciary duties owed to 
shareholders and return to an older conception, whereby 
officers and directors were said to owe fiduciary duties to the 
corporate entity itself.176 Under this conception, so long as 
  
 173 See Brudney, supra note 2, at 448-49; Mitchell, supra note 2, at 444-45; 
Stamler, supra note 2, at 1341-42. 
 174 See Baird & Henderson, supra note 2, at 1313, 1315-16, 1328-29, 1333. 
 175 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 3-4. 
 176 In fact, the corporate law of the early twentieth century moved along these 
lines. As Lawrence Mitchell explains, prior to WWII, “[t]he corporation was . . . seen as 
an entity, with the duties of directors and officers running to the entity and not to the 
stockholders themselves.” Mitchell, supra note 2, at 447. As stockholders, owners of 
preferred were entitled to enforce these duties via litigation. This deals with the 
problem at hand “by saying that stockholders qua stockholders had no fiduciary rights 
at all. Rather, the rights ran to the ‘community of interests’ which was the corporate 
entity.” Id. (citing Peeper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939), where the Supreme Court 
acknowledged fiduciary rights of creditors). 
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directors act in the best interests of the corporation as a 
whole—maximizing enterprise value—courts will not interfere. 
Thus, the modern norm of maximizing the value of the common 
stock would be replaced by a norm of maximizing the value of 
the enterprise as a whole.  
This “duty to the entity” approach is fine as far as it 
goes, and would block actions that harm both the preferred and 
the corporation itself, but it is inadequate to deal with zero-
sum situations like the allocation of merger proceeds. In 
James, for example, the preferred stockholders did not contest 
that the board had satisfied its Revlon duties and secured the 
best deal it could for the corporation as a whole.177 The dispute 
simply centered around the allocation of merger consideration 
as between the common and the preferred stockholders.178 In a 
zero-sum scenario, it becomes necessary to have some standard 
of fairness to judge the board’s actions against. 
As long ago as 1972, Victor Brudney identified the 
difficulty of developing a workable standard of fairness as one 
of the reasons courts were reluctant to provide preferred 
stockholders with meaningful fiduciary protections.179 Brudney 
went on to develop a standard of his own, looking for benchmarks 
in the priority rules in federal bankruptcy law, while 
acknowledging the difficulty of valuing the rights held by preferred 
stockholders.180 Brudney suggested that courts could be assisted by 
administrative agencies such as the SEC in evaluating whether the 
preferred had been accorded fair treatment, but he admitted the 
questionable feasibility of such a procedure.181 
Lawrence Mitchell also suggests that preferred 
stockholders should be entitled to fiduciary protections—but 
protections of a somewhat special sort. Rather than searching 
for a standard of fairness by attempting to determine the value 
of the preferred stockholders’ contractual rights, Mitchell 
focuses on the motivations of the board. He would allow 
preferred shareholders to bring fiduciary duty claims wherever 
they can show “differential treatment of the preferred and the 
common.”182 Where such differential treatment is demonstrated, 
the board would bear the burden of showing that the 
  
 177 LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 439 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 178 Id.  
 179 Brudney, supra note 2, at 446-49. 
 180 Id. at 486-87.  
 181 Id. at 487. 
 182 Mitchell, supra note 2, at 475. 
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challenged transaction was undertaken primarily for business 
reasons—to increase enterprise value—rather than simply to 
transfer wealth from the preferred to the common.183 Mitchell 
does not address the situation where the preferred control the 
board, but one can imagine the same standard applied in favor 
of common stockholders subjected to unfavorable treatment by 
a preferred-controlled board. 
One possibility for side-stepping the problem of defining 
standards of fairness would be to expand the availability of 
appraisal as a remedy for preferred stockholders.184 Instead of 
having fiduciary duty litigation as the sole recourse for 
aggrieved preferred stockholders, an appraisal action could be 
made more widely available where, for example, arrearages are 
canceled or preferred stock is cashed out in a merger. Such a 
remedy would seemingly avoid the difficulty of formulating an 
uncontroversial standard of fairness and reduce the judicial 
problem to simply valuing the preferred stock. Furthermore, 
such a determination would apparently not require a 
determination of the board’s motives, nor a review of its 
business decisions. Unfortunately, these seeming advantages 
are largely illusory. The value of preferred stock is intimately 
dependent upon the rights that stock confers. As a result, 
determining the fair value of preferred stock first requires 
determining what rights preferred stockholders possess that 
  
 183 Id. (“[I]f the primary or exclusive purpose of a transaction is to transfer 
wealth from the preferred to the common, it is inherently unfair. If, on the other hand, 
it is motivated primarily by business reasons—wealth creation—any incidental harm 
to the preferred is not unfair.”). Mitchell’s requirement that a transaction be motivated 
by “business reasons” looks similar to the “legitimate business purpose” test for freeze-
outs in the close corporation context embraced by the Massachusetts courts in Donahue 
v. Rodd Electrotype and Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, but pointedly rejected by 
the Delaware courts in Weinberger. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E. 2d 
505, 515 (Mass. 1975); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E. 2d 657, 663 
(Mass. 1976); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983). The same 
objections that have been made as to the “legitimate business purpose” test are 
applicable to Dean Mitchell’s “business reasons” test—namely, that given the ease of 
formulating some purpose, such a test can provide no meaningful protection not offered by a 
fairness test. See, e.g., Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715 (“[W]e do not believe that any additional 
meaningful protection is afforded . . . by the business purpose requirement . . . .”).  
 184 See Stamler, supra note 2, at 1336. Under Delaware Code § 162, minority 
shareholders dissenting from a merger may elect to institute an appraisal action and 
receive the judicially determined fair value of their stock as an alternative to the 
consideration provided in the merger agreement. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 162 (West 
2013). While the availability of appraisal is somewhat limited in Delaware, there is no 
reason why, in theory, it could not be made more widely available in the event of a wide 
array of fundamental transactions potentially affecting the value of stock. Indeed, 
appraisal is more widely available under the MBCA than under the Delaware Code. 
See generally Mary Siegel, An Appraisal of the Model Business Corporation Act’s 
Appraisal Rights Provisions, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231 (2011).  
1202 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:4 
cannot properly be taken away—the very question appraisal 
was meant to avoid. 
Another possibility—one that would generally avoid the 
difficulty of mediating between the conflicting interests of the 
common and the preferred—would be to treat preferred 
stockholders more like creditors for purposes of fiduciary duty 
claims. Normally, of course, creditors are not owed fiduciary 
duties.185 The common shareholders are typically the residual 
claimants on the value of the corporation. A regime of fiduciary 
duties requiring the board to seek to maximize the wealth of 
common shareholders will therefore be welfare maximizing in 
most cases—in short, the shareholders as residual claimants 
have the proper incentives to maximize societal gain from the 
operation of the corporation.186 Creditors’ incentives typically 
are not wealth-maximizing, because creditors do not share fully 
in the corporation’s upside and thus will tend to be risk-
averse.187 Accordingly, to the extent that creditors are to be 
protected from opportunism, it must be through the contracts 
they negotiate rather than fiduciary duties requiring the board 
to seek to maximize creditor wealth. 
Where the corporation is on the verge of bankruptcy, 
however, the situation changes. The common stockholders, 
facing little or no downside, have an incentive to engage in 
risk-seeking behavior, taking large risks if they provide even a 
  
 185 See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 2, at 448-49; Baird & Henderson, supra note 
2, at 1315-16. 
 186 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1431 
(1993); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 395, 403-04 (1983) (“As the residual claimants, the shareholders are the group 
with the appropriate incentives . . . to make discretionary decisions.”); Fried & Ganor, 
supra note 2, at 980 (“As residual claimants, common shareholders tend to be affected 
most, on the margin, by changes in firm value. Accordingly, their interests are 
generally aligned with the goal of maximizing corporate value. Thus, giving common 
shareholders control of the board and permitting them to use this control to advance 
their own interests should increase corporate value.”); Jonathan R. Macey, An 
Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive 
Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 23-24 (1991); 
Smith, supra note 2, at 322 (“[T]he entrepreneur is the right decisionmaker when her 
private benefits are consistent with total returns, and the venture capitalist is the right 
decisionmaker when his monetary returns are consistent with total returns.” (citing 
Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial 
Contracting, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 473, 476 (1992))). 
 187 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the 
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 91 (1985) (“Creditors are generally more risk averse 
than stockholders; why else do creditors arrange for the equity claimants to bear the 
most risk? Creditors accept a lower rate of return on investment precisely because the 
stockholders are wiped out first.”); Macey, supra note 186, at 28-29. 
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small chance of a positive result. The creditors, on the other 
hand, who have payment priority in the event of a bankruptcy 
or other liquidation, begin to look much more like the residual 
claimants because all or most of any additional dollar of value 
will go to creditors when the company goes under. Thus, it is 
the creditors who have the proper incentives in this instance, 
and it is the maximization of creditor wealth that will tend to 
maximize societal well-being.188 In fact, the Delaware courts 
have recognized that, in the so-called “zone of insolvency,” 
boards of directors will owe fiduciary duties to creditors as well 
as—or instead of—common stockholders.189 
A similar situation may arise with preferred 
stockholders, and thus a similar solution is tempting. When 
large arrearages have built up, making the possibility of return 
to the common shareholders remote or nonexistent, it is the 
preferred stockholders rather than the common who are the 
true residual claimants. Trados represents a case in point. 
With nearly $60 million in arrearages standing between the 
common stockholders and any return, the common shares were 
worth virtually nothing. With the preferred stockholders 
bearing virtually all of the downside, the common had every 
reason to take even a negative-expected-value gamble on 
turning the company around, rather than selling or liquidating 
it in a fashion that would leave them empty-handed.190 In such 
a situation, it is the preferred who possess the efficiency-
  
 188 As Chancellor Strine explained, “[i]n insolvency, creditors, as residual 
claimants to a definitionally-inadequate pool of assets become exposed to substantial 
risk as the entity goes forward . . . . The elimination of the stockholders’ interest in the 
firm and the increased risk to creditors is said to justify imposing fiduciary obligations 
towards the company’s creditors on the directors.” Prod. Res. Grp., LLC v. NCT Grp., 
Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 791 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 189 See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 
CIV.A.12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *1155-56 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (“[I]n managing 
the business affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances 
may arise when the right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the 
corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockholders . . . would make if given 
the opportunity to act.”).  
 190 See Baird & Henderson, supra note 2, at 1331. Consider a simplified 
example where the preferred stockholders had accumulated arrearages and liquidation 
preferences of $50 million, such that in a liquidation the common would receive 
nothing from the first $50 million, but everything above $50 million. If the company’s 
assets were under $50 million—a board controlled by and beholden to the common 
stockholders—would have no incentive not to roll the dice on a turnaround rather than 
pursue a liquidation. If, for example, the company had $10 million in assets, the 
common would have every incentive to risk the entire $10 million on even a 1% chance 
(or 0.1% or 0.01% chance) of generating a return of $100 million. The fruits of success 
would redound to the benefit of the common, while the wages of failure would be paid 
entirely by the preferred. 
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maximizing incentives. Thus, it may be appealing to recognize 
a “zone of arrearages” doctrine paralleling the “zone of 
insolvency” doctrine enunciated by the Delaware courts. Like 
the “zone of insolvency” doctrine, recognizing fiduciary duties 
to the preferred in the “zone of arrearages” would avoid the 
need to either evaluate the competing claims of the common 
and the preferred stockholders or to sweep embarrassingly 
difficult questions under the rug by invoking the business 
judgment rule.191  
Yet another possibility is to abandon the notion of 
fiduciary protections for preferred shareholders altogether and 
fully embrace the contractual nature of preferred stock. In a 
recent article, Baird and Henderson make a broader argument 
that modern financial engineering has rendered dubious any 
attempt to generalize about the identity of the residual 
claimant, or the efficiency-maximizing incentives faced by 
various corporate constituencies. As a result, they argue, the 
notion of fiduciary duties in corporate law should be abandoned 
altogether, because such duties are more likely to interfere 
with voluntary contractual arrangements than to provide any 
overall benefit.192  
In doing so, they reject the alternative of recognizing 
fiduciary duties to the corporate entity itself, requiring the 
board—whoever is in control—to seek to maximize firm value. 
They point out that, just as courts would enforce loan 
covenants that are “value reducing ex post,” courts should also 
enforce preferred stockholder control rights enabling the 
preferred to favor their own interests over the corporation’s.193 
Baird and Henderson point in particular to VC deals, where it 
may often be desirable for preferred stockholders to secure 
contingent control rights that serve as “trip wires,” providing 
  
 191 See Baird & Henderson, supra note 2, at 1312-15, 1326 (“By asserting that 
fiduciary duties turn on the identity of the residual claimant . . . a court avoids having 
to use the business judgment rule in circumstances when a decision, however sensible, 
is transparently contrary to the interests of the shareholders.”). It bears mentioning, 
however, that some influential commentators have suggested that the “zone of 
insolvency” doctrine is something of a mirage, and that the results in the cases can be 
more parsimoniously explained by application of the business judgment rule in a 
manner highly deferential to the board. See Kelli A. Alces & Larry E. Ribstein, 
Directors’ Duties in Failing Firms, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 529, 538-39 (2007). 
 192 Baird & Henderson, supra note 2, at 1314 (“Corporate finance and 
corporate governance are not one-size-fits-all, and firm capital structures are 
heterogeneous, complex, negotiated, and, most importantly, priced by the market. 
From this perspective, courts should tread lightly, even when faced with self-serving 
behavior, lest the upset what they do not understand.”). 
 193 Id. at 1332-33. 
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incentives for the common stockholders to manage the 
company well and allowing VCs to seize control and favor 
themselves at the expense of the enterprise, should things go 
poorly.194 Using fiduciary duties to require preferred-controlled 
boards to show that their actions are maximizing the value of 
the entity would, they argue, simply interfere with the parties’ 
contractual arrangements, destroying the desired incentive 
structure and adding legal uncertainty, thus making it more 
difficult to price contractual terms in the first place.195 
Finally, Bratton and Wachter have rejected the 
possibility of treating preferred stock as either wholly 
“corporate” in nature or wholly “contractual” in nature.196 
Instead, they call for a kind of practical ad hockery—
attempting to give force to contractual terms, but holding out 
the possibility that the contracts themselves are not complete 
and should be supported by a fiduciary backstop.197 Beyond a 
firm rejection of fully “corporate” or fully “contractual” 
treatment of preferred stock, Bratton and Wachter are perhaps 
not as clear as they might be in the particulars of their 
prescriptions. Despite the nod toward primacy of contract, the 
process of contractual interpretation they propose takes place 
under a judicial scrutiny that is, if anything, more searching 
than that of the Delaware courts. Their framework is “built on 
three principles”: 
First, the meaning and scope of preferred contract rights should be 
determined by the court rather than the issuer board of directors. 
Second, conflicts between preferred and common should not be 
  
 194 Id. (“Giving senior investors control rights at certain times may be 
efficient, even if they use these rights to serve their selfish ends at the expense of firm 
value. The granting of this real option . . . may create just the right incentives for 
shareholder managers to operate the firm efficiently in the first place.”). 
 195 Id. at 1333 (“The ability to put in place directors who would engage in a 
sale that suited the interests of the preferred stockholders is not different from a 
secured creditor who bargains for the right to repossess collateral in the event of 
default and who can exercise that right without having to show that it is value 
maximizing ex post . . . . Imposing fiduciary duties in this environment, even one that 
imposed a duty to the corporation as a whole and that came with a generous business 
judgment rule, is a potential source of mischief.”). 
 196 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 68 (“In the end, however, we do not 
think that paradigmatic consistency is a viable alternative given a subject matter on 
which two paradigms come to bear.”). 
 197 Id. (“Left to our own devices, we would opt for nuanced mediation across 
the paradigmatic divide. Consistency here lies in taking a considered look in both 
directions when difficult conflicts arise. Contract should be the major theme, but only 
on the understanding that completeness should not be assumed.”); see also id. at 4 (the 
corporate and contractual “paradigms come to bear and decision makers need to look 
both ways and synchronize the two paradigms’ simultaneous application”). 
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decided by reference to a norm of common stock value maximization. 
Enterprise value should be the reference, more particularly, 
maximization of the value of the equity as a whole. Third, independent 
director determinations of conflicts between classes of preferred and 
common should not be accorded ordinary business judgment review. 
Instead, a door should be left open for good faith review tailored to 
the context—a showing of bad faith treatment of the preferred where 
the integrity of the deal has been undermined.198  
Two aspects of this framework bear emphasis. First, Bratton 
and Wachter’s emphasis on a norm of entity value maximization 
may not actually be in conflict with Baird and Henderson’s 
observation that it may often be efficient to allow stockholders to 
contract, ex ante, for the right to take actions that may harm 
the entity ex post. After all, Bratton and Wachter still advocate 
giving content to contractual rights where they are clear; the 
requirement to maximize entity value is merely a fiduciary 
backstop in situations where the contractual arrangement is 
less than clear. If there is a disagreement at all, it is that 
Bratton and Wachter might impose a somewhat higher 
drafting burden in establishing a “waiver” of fiduciary duties 
and the right of a class of stockholders to favor itself over the 
entity.199 Second, Bratton and Wachter do not distinguish 
between situations where the common are in control and those 
where the preferred are in control; they apply the same 
framework in either situation. The analysis in the next two 
parts suggests that this is overly simplistic. 
IV. FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO PREFERRED STOCKHOLDERS  
In light of the seemingly comprehensive scope of the 
doctrinal alternatives proposed by commentators over the 
years, it is perhaps surprising that no one has seen fit to 
conduct an analysis, from the ground up, of whether and when 
fiduciary duties might be appropriate in the context of VC 
preferred stock. This part provides such an analysis for 
fiduciary duties running to preferred stockholders when the 
common control the board, concluding that mandatory 
fiduciary duties owed to preferred stockholders are not 
justified. The next part analyzes the desirability of fiduciary 
duties running to common stockholders when the preferred 
control the board. 
  
 198 Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). 
 199 Id. at 63 (such a provision “arguably should be enshrined in block capitals 
and initialed in the margin”).  
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The fiduciary duty with bite in the preferred stock 
context is the duty of loyalty. That is, if a board is found to 
have improperly favored the common over the preferred—for 
example, by diverting value from the preferred to the common 
in a dummy merger—the impropriety, if any, must consist of a 
breach of a duty of loyalty owed to the preferred. The duty of 
loyalty is the archetypical “mandatory” rule in corporate law, in 
that it is not permitted to be altered by contractual 
agreement—even in Delaware, where freedom of contract is 
generally respected.200 If this were not so, and fiduciary duties 
were, like most corporate law rules, simply default rules,201 
nothing particularly important would turn on the question of 
whether to apply fiduciary duties in the VC context. If the 
parties did not want fiduciary duties, they would simply contract 
around them.202 It is the mandatory nature of fiduciary duties 
that is crucial. The question thus becomes: is a mandatory duty 
of loyalty owed to preferred stockholders justified? 
In a classic article, Jeffrey Gordon set out five hypotheses 
that might explain the existence of mandatory rules in corporate 
law: “the investor protection hypothesis, the uncertainty 
hypothesis, the public good hypothesis, the innovation 
hypothesis and the opportunistic amendment hypothesis.”203 Of 
these, the uncertainty and innovation hypotheses do not apply 
directly to fiduciary duties, in particular, as a form of mandatory 
rule. Gordon ultimately found some of the remaining hypotheses 
  
 200 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate 
Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV 1416, 1417 (1989) (noting that one of the few mandatory 
rules of corporate law is one that “require[s] managers to live up to a duty of loyalty to 
investors”); Fried & Ganor, supra note 2, at 1417-18 (“corporate fiduciary law is 
considered mandatory and not contractually alterable.”). Note that while Fried and 
Ganor speak of “fiduciary law” in general as being mandatory, it is really the duty of 
loyalty that is most properly considered mandatory. Under Delaware law, at least, the 
duty of care can be largely vitiated in the corporate charter. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 102(b)(7) (West 2011). 
 201 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 200, at 1417 (“The corporate 
code in almost every state is an ‘enabling’ statute.”); Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate 
Default Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical Examination, 6 J. EMP. L. STUD. 279, 280 
(2009) (“Much of corporate law consists of nonmandatory ‘enabling’ statutes.”). 
 202 Listokin finds that corporate charters are significantly more likely to 
contain “default rules” that require the parties to explicitly opt out than they are to 
contain “‘menu’ laws” that require the parties to explicitly opt in. Listoken, supra note 
201, at 279. In that respect, even if fiduciary duties were not mandatory, it might 
matter whether the parties were required to opt in to them, or to opt out of them. Still, 
one might expect the effects found by Listokin to be less pronounced in the VC 
context—featuring sophisticated investors and heavily negotiated charter terms—than 
in the ordinary public company situation involving common stock. 
 203 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1549, 1555 (1989). 
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more convincing than others, but it is worth examining each of 
them in sequence in the context of mandatory fiduciary duties to 
preferred stockholders.  
As we will see, the hypotheses that were implausible in 
the common-stock context become still more implausible here, 
and even those hypotheses that seemed compelling become less 
so in the context of preferred stockholders. In one way or 
another, these hypotheses all depend on a vision of stockholders 
as widely dispersed, apathetic (rationally or otherwise), and 
operating at a substantial informational and bargaining 
disadvantage in relation to management and the board. These 
hypotheses for the application of mandatory rules fall short 
when applied to VCs, not in small part due to the extraordinary 
financial (and often managerial) control that VCs exercise, the 
concentrated and sophisticated nature of VCs as investors, and 
the minutely bargained contracts they bring to the table. 
A. Traditional Rationales for Fiduciary Duties: The 
Investor Protection Hypothesis 
The investor protection hypothesis can take a number of 
forms. At its most crude, the investor protection hypothesis 
assumes that issuers have an informational advantage over 
investors, and yet investors are still willing to invest.204 As a 
result of this informational advantage, the hypothesis goes, 
investors will not fully understand—or even know—the terms of 
the stock issuance. Issuers are thus able to include terms in the 
preferred stock contract that are disadvantageous to investors, 
without these terms being fully reflected in the price.205 
This vision of issuers exploiting naïve investors seems to 
loom large for critics of Delaware’s preferred stock 
jurisprudence. In Brudney’s call for fiduciary protection, for 
  
 204 In the absence of an informational imbalance, any terms that are 
disadvantageous to investors will result in investors lowering the amount they would 
be willing to pay for the stock. As a result, the issuers would be forced to internalize 
the costs of any undesirable features of the share contract, giving them an incentive to 
avoid such features. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 200, at 1430 (“Unless 
entrepreneurs can fool the investors, a choice of terms that reduces investors’ expected 
returns will produce a corresponding reduction in price. So the people designing the 
terms under which the corporation will be run have the right incentives.”). 
 205 See Gordon, supra note 203, at 1556 (“An investor protection argument 
flows directly from rejection of the contractarian information assumption. Many 
investors do not read the prospectus or do not understand or fully register the 
entailments of charter provisions. Promoters may therefore include charter terms that 
negatively affect shareholders without bearing the cost . . . .”). 
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example, he describes preferred stockholders as typically having 
“relatively small stakes”—implying rational ignorance or 
apathy—and suggests that preferred stockholders are unlikely 
to be aware of the fact that arrearages may be cancelled by 
class vote or dummy merger.206 In his note, Jeffrey Stamler also 
argues that preferred stockholders simply must not have fully 
appreciated the ways in which arrearages could be eliminated 
or liquidation preferences evaded,207 concluding that these 
uninformed investors require judicial protection.208 
Jeffrey Gordon dismisses the investor protection 
hypothesis in the context of publicly traded securities, pointing to 
the structural protections provided by securities markets in which 
sophisticated traders are active,209 together with the protections 
provided by underwriters and the involvement of large 
institutional investors in the IPO market.210 While VCs invest 
prior to an IPO and the creation of a public secondary market, 
  
 206 See Brudney, supra note 2, at 459 (“If the preferreds’ investment contract 
ever expressly provides for the possibility of modification or cancellation of arrearages 
by a class vote, that feature of the contract is rarely pressed on the investor’s attention 
in selling him the stock; nor is there any reason to believe that the possibility of 
eliminating arrearages by contrived merger is called to the investor’s attention.”). 
Brudney goes on to argue that  
[t]he bargaining posture of the preferred stock investor when he first invests, 
and the intrinsic limitations on his ability to make an intelligent assessment 
at that time, of the risk of effectively unilateral arrearage cancellation in the 
indefinite future, taint the validity of the inference that the initial purchase 
constitutes consent to unconstrained rebargaining by the majority of the class 
when the occasion to modify arrearages materializes.  
Id. at 460 n.39. 
 207 Stamler, supra note 2, at 1341 (“[S]ome courts permitted arrearages to be 
eliminated by . . . amendment or merger on the theory that preferred holders purchased 
their stock knowing that their rights were statutorily defeasible by amendment or 
merger. But few preferreds could actually have known that their rights were not 
vested.” (footnote omitted)). 
 208 Stamler explicitly rejects the possibility “that preferred stock prices 
[necessarily] already reflect the arrearage elimination risk inherent in owning 
preferred stock” on the grounds that “this argument assumes that prospective investors 
are fully informed of these risks, an assumption which is not necessarily accurate.” Id. 
at 1354. He acknowledges that the “smart money” may purchase in full knowledge, but 
argues that “uninformed investors” will not, and that “[t]hese are the stockholders who 
require protection.” Id. 
 209 Gordon, supra note 203, at 1557 (“Well-functioning securities markets 
aggregate information from all active market participants, embody that information in 
a single fact—price—and make that fact available for free . . . . [U]ninformed investors 
will pay too high a price only if the market is not efficient, that is, only if there are too 
few sophisticated market participants who choose to become specifically informed.”). 
 210 Id. at 1559 (“Because shares of the same class must have identical terms, 
the firm cannot offer better terms to sophisticated investors than it does to 
unsophisticated investors. Thus unsophisticated investors capture the benefits of 
underwriters’ efforts on behalf of sophisticated investors.”). 
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the investor protection hypothesis is, if anything, even less 
compelling in the VC context. It is highly implausible to 
suggest that VCs are at an informational disadvantage in 
drafting share contracts, vis-à-vis the founding entrepreneur of 
the startup company. VCs are almost always highly sophisticated, 
experienced investors, and they are repeat players when it comes 
to designing investment terms. It strains credulity to suggest 
that they are unaware of, or unable to comprehend and price, 
the provisions of the preferred stock contract. 
In his influential work on fiduciary duties, Lawrence 
Mitchell has set forth a more sophisticated version of the investor 
protection hypothesis. According to Mitchell, rather than being 
rooted in contractual concerns about information asymmetry, 
fiduciary duties are best seen as being rooted in a power 
disparity.211 In short, he argues that fiduciary duties are properly  
imposed in situations of significant power disparity, where one party 
is given responsibility and power over something that matters to 
another party and that vulnerable party is at the mercy of the 
power-holding party. Once the relationship has been established, the 
dominated party effectively loses any control over the subject of the 
relationship, while the power-holder remains autonomous.212  
Mitchell goes on to characterize the situation of the preferred 
stockholder in a common-dominated corporation in these terms. 
Whatever force this description carries in the case of 
publicly traded preferred, it rings hollow as a description of the 
relationship between VC preferred stockholders and a startup 
corporation, even where the board is controlled by the common. 
The very structure of the relationship makes it impossible for 
the VC to “lose[] any control over the subject of the relationship” 
while the founder “remains autonomous.” VC financing is 
virtually always staged, such that the funds necessary to 
operate the startup are doled out incrementally.213 These 
increments can be quite short, on the order of a few months.214 
This staging provides the VC with enormous practical power and 
  
 211 Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1684-86 (1990). 
 212 Mitchell, supra note 2, at 457-58. 
 213 See Smith, supra note 2, at 323; D. Gordon Smith, Team Production in 
Venture Capital Investing, 24 J. CORP. L. 949, 952 (1999) (“[S]taged financing [is] the 
practice of investing only enough money to allow the Entrepreneur to progress to the 
next milestone in its business plan.”). 
 214 See Smith, supra note 2, at 324 (“Staged investments typically occur over a 
relatively short time period, almost always less than one year apart and frequently at 
much shorter intervals.”). 
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control, even where formal control is lacking. In effect, the VC 
always holds a Sword of Damocles over the “fortunate” 
entrepreneur’s head, threatening to withhold the next round of 
financing and wipe out at a stroke the entrepreneur’s 
investment of time, energy, and often money.215 
Thus, it is a tremendous stretch to describe VCs as 
being “at the mercy” of the common stockholders, even where 
the VCs do not formally control the board. If fiduciary 
protections are to be deemed necessary, it will need to be for 
some other reason. 
B. Traditional Rationales for Fiduciary Duties: The Public 
Good Hypothesis 
The public good hypothesis holds that in the absence of 
mandatory rules, a large variety of contractual terms would 
proliferate. The existence of a large variety of potential terms 
would generate increased uncertainty and result in increased 
costs, including the need for potential investors to investigate 
the particulars of each stock issue.216 The first-order costs of 
novel contractual terms may be borne by the issuers themselves, 
as investors will insist on paying less for untested contractual 
clauses. Ultimately, however, a profusion of customized terms 
may erode even the certainty surrounding standard terms, 
which will tend to be tested less frequently by litigation as they 
decline in relative frequency. As a result, the value of 
Delaware’s case law itself as a source of legal certainty could 
eventually be eroded.217 
  
 215 See, e.g., id. at 323-24 (“This threat of abandonment . . . mitigates the 
entrepreneur’s holdup incentive and provides substantial incentives for the 
entrepreneur to maximize the potential of the company quickly.”); William A. Sahlman, 
The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 
506 (1990) (“The most important mechanism for controlling the venture is staging the 
infusion of capital.”). 
 216 See Gordon, supra note 203, at 1564 (“In a regime of contractual 
freedom . . . the corporate form might vary radically among firms . . . . One clear cost 
imposed under such a regime, as compared to a mandatory regime, is the uncertainty 
associated with different terms.”). The uncertainty hypothesis is similar, in its general 
outline, to numerus clausus explanations for the limited number of forms of property 
rights found in property law. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal 
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 
(2000). 
 217 See Gordon, supra note 203, at 1567 (“Viewed globally, a regime of 
complete contractual freedom in corporate law imposes externalities. As charters 
diverge from the standard form, the uncertainty surrounding even standard form 
terms begins to grow. Those terms are tested less frequently, either through operation 
in particular circumstances or through successive judicial interpretation.”). 
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Whatever purchase this hypothesis has for unusual 
terms in publicly traded common-stock issues, it can have little 
application in determining whether fiduciary duties should be 
extended to VCs holding preferred stock. Preferred stock terms 
are far from standardized; they are almost always heavily 
negotiated and specifically tailored to the unique circumstances 
and needs of the particular startup and the particular VCs. Once 
issued, ownership of the preferred stock almost always remains 
with the original VC who participated in crafting the terms and 
is virtually never transferred or sold to an unsophisticated 
party. If anything, it is the imposition of mandatory fiduciary 
duties that would increase uncertainty, throwing into doubt 
whether and when the literal terms of the share contract will be 
enforced literally. At the end of the day, the “unfairness” of a 
contractual term only matters to the extent that it is not fully 
and accurately priced. Adding a layer of legal uncertainty only 
makes the task of pricing contractual terms more difficult. 
A related version of the public good hypothesis argues 
that corporate law—including the imposition of fiduciary 
duties—reduces transaction costs by providing a set of “off-the-
rack” rules for parties to choose from, rather than requiring 
parties to negotiate each arrangement from scratch.218 Viewed 
in this light, fiduciary duties have an especially important role 
to play. As Bratton points out repeatedly, share contracts are 
inevitably incomplete since circumstances beyond the 
contemplation of the drafters will inevitably arise. Fiduciary duties 
can be explained as an attempt to plug these gaps.219 As 
Easterbrook and Fischel point out, “Corporate law—and in 
particular the fiduciary principle enforced by courts—fills in 
  
 218 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 30-31 (2008); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 200, at 1444. 
 219 See Bratton, Downside, supra note 2, at 894 (“The terms of venture capital 
contracts improve in significant respects on those of traditional preferred stock 
contracts. But they are not perfect, and they offer incomplete protection from issuer 
opportunism.”); id. at 934 (“The complete contingent claims contract that the law thus 
demands as a vehicle for protecting preferred in the absence of boardroom control 
arguably is an economic impossibility. Preferred stock contracts traverse a considerable 
expanse of noncontractible territory.”); Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 2 (the 
common stock contract “is almost entirely incomplete, with open-ended fiduciary duties 
substituted for negotiated financial rights”); id. at 22 (“Corporate fiduciary law can be 
defended from a contractarian perspective on the ground that common stockholders 
invest pursuant to a contract that is inevitably incomplete.”); id. at 33 (“The pattern of 
incomplete contracting [is deeply] embedded and leaves an open a door [sic] for 
conscience-shocking opportunism.”); id. (The dummy merger example reminds us that 
“[preferred stock] contracts can be incomplete in fact and make no business sense 
whatsoever if their performance is remitted to a common maximizing board without 
backstop judicial scrutiny.”). 
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the blanks and oversights with the terms that people would 
have bargained for had they anticipated the problems and been 
able to transact costlessly in advance.”220 In a world of costly 
contracting—and, as a consequence, incomplete contracts—
fiduciary duties have some advantages. Rather than having to 
contract ahead of time for every conceivable situation, parties 
can rely on the ex post common-law-style protections of 
fiduciary duties.221 
While this argument convincingly explains why 
fiduciary duties will often be desirable, it is less persuasive in 
explaining why fiduciary duties should be mandatory. 
Easterbrook and Fischel suggest that standardization results 
in a more detailed and reliable case law.222 Gordon, too, echoes 
this thinking, arguing that a single, mandatory fiduciary 
standard “represents a valuable public good.”223 
However true this may have been in the past, it is 
perhaps time to recognize that it may be less true today. Over 
the past century, a tremendous body of fiduciary duty case law 
has been generated, and now stands ready to benefit any who 
desire to avail themselves of it. The canon is written, it exists 
in the world, and the bookshelf bows under its weight. Most 
importantly, it may be referred to and invoked by contracting 
parties, if they so choose. Contracting parties need not invent 
their own detailed fiduciary standards; they can simply 
incorporate the existing standard by reference. Indeed, 
Lawrence Mitchell, in arguing the need for fiduciary protection, 
concluded by suggesting that preferred stockholders could—
  
 220 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 200, at 1444-45. 
 221 See id. at 1445 (“Court systems have a comparative advantage in supplying 
answers to questions that do not occur in time to be resolved ex ante. Common law 
systems need not answer questions unless they occur.”); see also Gordon, supra note 
203, at 1593 (“Fiduciary duties provide a set of standards to restrain insiders in 
exercising their discretionary power over the corporation and its shareholders in 
contingencies not specifically foreseeable and thus over which the parties could not 
contract.”). In many ways, this argument resembles Benjamin Cardozo’s classic defense 
of vague “reasonable person” standards in accident law—it allows courts to resolve, ex 
post, matters that would be expensive or impossible for courts, legislatures, or private 
parties to provide for ex ante by detailed rules and regulations. See Pokora v. Wabash 
Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934). 
 222 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 200, at 1445 (“The accumulation of 
cases dealing with unusual problems . . . supplies a level of detail that is costly to 
duplicate through private bargaining.”). 
 223 Gordon, supra note 203, at 1593 (“[A] stable conception of fiduciary duty 
develops only through applying a single standard across a great range of cases. Such a 
baseline represents a valuable public good, since the verbal formulas and the standards 
would vary considerably in the absence of a mandatory rule.”). 
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and occasionally do—provide for fiduciary-type protections 
contractually.224 
Herein lies the folly of worrying overmuch about the 
necessary incompleteness of preferred stock contracts or the 
“noncontractible” nature of the stockholder relationship. It is 
patently true that it is impossible to write a contract that 
explicitly prescribes, in detail, how to deal with every possible 
contingency (though the length and level of detail of VC 
preferred-stock contracts suggest that the parties make a 
valiant attempt). Even so, contracts can complete themselves 
by providing mechanisms and rules of decision for deciding 
disputes that arise later. These mechanisms could conceivably 
range from full, traditional fiduciary protection through the 
courts, to arbitration pursuant to a specified standard of 
decision, to a spirited round of rock-paper-scissors. The ability 
of the parties to provide a mechanism for dispute resolution by 
contract can complete an otherwise incomplete contract, 
traversing any otherwise noncontractible terrain. 
Several objections are possible. First, the canon—the 
body of decisional law that describes fiduciary duty—will 
change over time, as new circumstances arise and are 
addressed in litigated cases. Should parties who invoke 
fiduciary duties be subject to the law as it existed at the time of 
the contract, or as it has subsequently evolved? Second, if 
fiduciary duties are not applied uniformly, the body of case law 
will gradually become less uniform itself, and the value of 
fiduciary law as a public good will ultimately be eroded. Third, 
it is difficult to imagine circumstances where stockholders 
would not want the benefit of at least a duty of loyalty. What is 
the harm, then, in providing it? Finally, if it is not mandatory, 
the dispute resolution mechanism established by contract may 
itself be subject to opportunistic amendment over time. 
The first objection can be dealt with by the parties 
themselves. Parties desiring a completely stable fiduciary 
regime can specify that the relationship be governed by the 
fiduciary duty law in place at the time the contract is entered 
into. Parties desiring to benefit from the evolution of the law 
  
 224 Mitchell, supra note 2, at 476 (“Perhaps the best interim solution would be 
a covenant precluding the corporation from behaving in a manner that defeats the 
preferred’s legitimate expectations. Such provisions already are used in the specific 
context of preferred conversion rights. In effect, such a covenant incorporates the 
fiduciary concept [advocated by Mitchell] into the preferred stock provisions of the 
certificate . . . .”). 
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can either say so in their contract, or amend their contract to 
adopt new law. While amendment would likely not be feasible 
where the shareholders are dispersed and rationally 
inattentive, the concentrated and sophisticated nature of VC 
investment makes dynamic amendment a realistic possibility. 
Indeed, the staged nature of VC financing provides a natural 
opportunity for periodic amendment, if desired. I describe in 
the Conclusion below steps the Delaware legislature could take 
to clarify the ability and process by which parties may select a 
fiduciary regime by contract.  
The second objection is at least potentially more serious. 
After all, if fiduciary duty case law is to remain a vital source of 
detailed decisional law, it needs to be continually tested in 
contemporary circumstances. If issuers and stockholders are 
permitted to pick and choose elements of fiduciary duty, the 
precedential benefits of a uniform standard may be lost. This 
concern, however, is overblown. First, the enormous body of 
existing case law already provides a valuable reservoir of 
experience. Second, the fact that some—perhaps most—VC 
cases will no longer be governed by standard fiduciary duties 
does not mean that fiduciary duties will not be litigated in the 
vast majority of other contexts. In particular, typical fiduciary 
duty cases will continue to arise with respect to common stock, 
providing a vital source of contemporary decisional law. 
Finally, a body of case law has developed, and will continue to 
develop, around the standard contractual provisions VCs 
include in their preferred stock investments. Debt contracts 
have not been rendered unmanageable by the absence of 
fiduciary protections, and there is little reason to fear that 
preferred stock contracts would be, either. 
The third and fourth objections are more easily 
discussed in the context of the opportunistic amendment 
hypothesis and are thus addressed below.  
C. Traditional Rationales for Fiduciary Duties: The 
Opportunistic Amendment Hypothesis 
More promising as an argument for fiduciary duties is 
the opportunistic amendment hypothesis, which argues that 
mandatory law can function as “a hands-tying mechanism that 
provides assurance against opportunistic charter amendment.”225 
  
 225 Gordon, supra note 203, at 1573. 
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As we have seen, common-controlled boards have historically 
had significant bargaining advantages, enabling them to extract 
seemingly self-destructive concessions from the preferred 
stockholders, or to bypass them altogether in pushing through 
amendments or mergers that expropriate value from the 
preferred.226 Some amendment mechanism will be necessary 
because “the corporate contract is inevitably incomplete.”227 Once 
the share contract is subject to amendment, however, even the 
right to a class vote will be inadequate to protect the preferred 
from opportunistic amendment. 
At its simplest, the opportunistic amendment hypothesis 
suggests that whoever controls the board will control—or at 
least unduly influence—the amendment process. This can take 
the form of inside directors taking advantage of the shareholders 
as a whole or of the common stockholders using control of the 
board to take advantage of the preferred. In either case, the 
dominant party will be “continually tempted to relax fiduciary 
standards that govern their behavior and expose them to 
liability.”228 Even where the preferred formally have the ability 
to block amendment by class vote, “shareholder voting as a 
means of evaluating and consenting to a proposed charter 
amendment is fraught with severe problems, in particular, 
collective action problems in acquiring and disseminating 
information among shareholders, and strategic behavior by 
insiders that amounts to economic coercion.”229 Thus, the 
argument goes, even if the preferred stockholders provide for 
fiduciary-type protections by contract, these protections risk 
being whittled away by subsequent opportunistic amendment if 
they are not mandatory.230 
This argument is perfectly coherent—perhaps even 
compelling—in the typical public shareholder scenario. It is, 
however, simply inapplicable in the VC setting. VC holders of 
preferred stock are not diffuse or dispersed; they are 
concentrated. They are not ignorant or apathetic; they are 
highly involved and strongly motivated. Furthermore, staged 
financing provides them with great practical economic 
  
 226 See supra Part II. 
 227 Gordon, supra note 203, at 1550. 
 228 Id. at 1593. 
 229 Id. at 1574-75. 
 230 Id. at 1574 (“Proposed charter amendments will be sponsored by a 
relatively cohesive proponent, the insiders, who will argue that the proposed change . . . is 
wealth increasing. A diffuse group of public shareholders must evaluate this claim . . . .”). 
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leverage, even in situations where they lack formal contractual 
rights. The idea that common stockholders will systematically 
take advantage of VCs borders on the fanciful. 
Even so, it might be considered worthwhile to impose 
fiduciary duties anyway. After all, it has long been argued that 
rational parties would always choose to impose a duty of 
loyalty, as the only practical way of dealing with the agency 
problems inherent in the long-term relationship between 
shareholders and management.231 And if rational parties would 
always choose fiduciary duties, the argument goes, what is the 
harm in making such duties mandatory? Indeed, viewed in this 
light, fiduciary duties are simply one species of a larger genus 
of legal rules, whereby courts monitor performance under long-
term contracts. John Coffee, for example, has argued that 
fiduciary duties “are analogous to similar legal rules that 
restrict opportunism in other areas of complex, long-term 
contracting.”232 This appears to be precisely the thinking behind 
Bratton and Wachter’s call for stronger review of opportunistic 
common stockholder behavior under the rubric of “good faith.”233 
The problems with this argument, however, are two-
fold. The most straightforward problem is that VC preferred 
stock is not the same kind of open-ended, long-term contract 
typically used for common stock, or even for older public issues 
of preferred stock. As Bratton and Wachter emphasize, 
“Perpetual preferred is no longer the rule . . . . Today’s 
preferred, whether publicly issued or privately placed, often 
has a due date and a promise to redeem.”234 This is particularly 
true for VC preferred, where “exit via mandatory redemption is 
  
 231 See id. at 1594 (“It is my argument that parties taking into account the 
insiders’ power and positional advantage would pick a standard of fairness or good 
faith as measured ex post and that this radically undermines the case for opting out of 
fiduciary duties.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate 
Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1621 (1989) (“In short, 
because such long-term relational contracting is necessarily incomplete, the court’s role 
becomes that of preventing one party from exercising powers delegated to it for mutual 
benefit of all shareholders for purely self-interested ends.”). Roberta Romano, along 
with others, occasionally suggests that a duty of loyalty is so likely to be voluntarily 
adopted that making it mandatory is of little consequence. See ROBERTA ROMANO, 
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 178 (2d ed. 2010) (“How much do you think 
investors would pay to invest in a new firm whose charter contains a provision 
eliminating the duty of loyalty?”); Bernard Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political 
and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542 (1990); Roberta Romano, Answering the 
Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1599 (1989). 
 232 Coffee, supra note 231, at 1620. 
 233 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 37. 
 234 Id. 
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hard-wired into the business model.”235 VC preferred stock 
typically remains outstanding for a few years at most, and 
opportunities for renegotiation are presented with each stage of 
financing, which may be only months apart. The relatively 
short-term nature of VC preferred stock dramatically reduces 
the universe of unforeseeable circumstances that must be 
provided for by the imposition of broadly drawn fiduciary 
duties. Furthermore, as discussed more fully above, the parties 
themselves can bridge any “noncontractible” terrain by 
voluntarily providing for fiduciary-type review. 
More fundamentally, the horizontal nature of the 
conflict between preferred and common stockholders simply 
does not lend itself to a “one-size-fits-all” solution that we can 
be confident all rational parties would voluntarily adopt. The 
familiar vertical conflict of interest between management and 
common shareholders is relatively simple. It may be said—with 
only slight risk of over-simplification—that management is and 
should be required to manage the corporation for the benefit of 
the shareholders. A simple duty of loyalty follows: management 
must favor the shareholders’ interests over their own.  
With a horizontal conflict of interest, these easy 
certainties melt away. Depending on the circumstances, the 
parties in a VC deal may desire one of many possible rules: 
that controlling common stockholders be required to manage 
the firm for the benefit of the preferred, maximize common 
stockholder value, or maximize enterprise value; that they be 
permitted to favor themselves over the preferred stockholders, 
while the preferred are protected by devices like redemption or 
conversion rights; that they be permitted to favor themselves 
under some circumstances, and not under others; or any 
number of permutations and combinations. To ask a judge to 
determine what the parties “would have wanted” is simply to 
tempt error. To ask a judge to do so even where it requires 
overriding the contractually expressed wishes of the parties is 
simply perverse, and risks destabilizing voluntary arrangements 
that the court simply does not understand. 
In sum, mandatory fiduciary duties in this context seek 
to solve a problem—a large noncontractible domain—that does 
not need solving, and in the process they threaten to create 
genuine difficulties for contracting parties. Therefore, fiduciary 
duties should not be imposed to protect VC preferred 
  
 235 Id. 
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stockholders from common stockholder opportunism. In the 
Conclusion below, I suggest several measures the Delaware 
courts or legislature could take to increase preferred 
stockholders’ ability to protect themselves, even in the absence 
of fiduciary protection. 
V. FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO COMMON STOCKHOLDERS 
In this part, I consider the reverse scenario, where it is 
the preferred stockholders who control the board of directors, 
and ask whether it is desirable to extend fiduciary protections 
to the common stockholders. As before, this part proceeds by 
examining the traditional rationales for imposing mandatory 
fiduciary duties as they apply in the context of a VC startup. 
This time, however, the analysis suggests that fiduciary duties 
do have a positive role to play. Common stockholders in VC 
startup companies are far more likely than the VCs to require 
protection from exploitative charter provisions and opportunistic 
amendment by controlling preferred. Furthermore, so long as 
courts allow controlling preferred to exercise their explicit 
contractual rights, there is far less danger that fiduciary duties 
will destabilize beneficial bargains. As a result, except insofar 
as the preferred stockholders have an explicit contractual right 
to take a particular action, a preferred-controlled board should 
be required to act with a goal of maximizing the wealth of the 
common stockholders. 
Recall that the most straightforward justification for 
mandatory fiduciary duties is that they serve to protect naïve 
investors from exploitation. That is, information disparities can 
lead to a situation where exploitative provisions are included in 
the charter or other share contract but are not fully appreciated 
and priced by the stockholders. As was discussed in Part IV, this 
story rings false where the VC is cast in the role of the bumpkin. 
The story gains plausibility, however, when the VC plays the role 
of the shark, and it is the entrepreneur playing the mark. 
Like the VCs, entrepreneurs must evaluate charter 
provisions without the protections provided by public secondary 
markets, or even by the institutional participants in the IPO 
market. Unlike VCs, however, entrepreneurs are rarely repeat 
players and are not expert at performing such evaluations. 
Startup entrepreneurs, of course, tend to be highly educated 
and driven, and they are no doubt intelligent and sophisticated 
in their specialty. This does not imply, however, that they 
possess the financial and legal sophistication required to 
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accurately price charter provisions. Despite the popular image 
of the serial entrepreneur, in reality the vast bulk of VC-
financed startups involve first-time entrepreneurs.236 Even the 
rare entrepreneur who has participated in at least one prior 
VC-financed startup will usually be sitting across the table 
from a VC who has participated in hundreds of startups. 
The situation is even more difficult for the employees 
who come later and receive a significant portion of their 
compensation in the form of stock grants and options. While in 
most industries, equity compensation is generally limited to 
high-level executives—who may be thought to possess 
substantial financial sophistication or who may benefit from 
the counsel of those who do—it is quite common in VC-financed 
startups for all but the most menial of employees to receive 
substantial compensation in the form of equity.237 Again, while 
the computer programmers and biologists who populate Silicon 
Valley are undoubtedly of higher-than-average intelligence, 
there is little reason to believe that they possess the financial 
sophistication necessary to evaluate and price what could be 
potentially exploitative charter terms. The result is a very real 
possibility that VCs could exploit their informational advantage 
to undercompensate entrepreneurs and other startup employees 
by paying them with common stock that is worth less than it 
may appear. 
Even when one’s conception of fiduciary duties is rooted 
in power disparities, as in Lawrence Mitchell’s formulation, the 
case for applying them here is equally strong. As discussed 
above, even where VCs lack formal control of the board, they 
wield substantial practical power over the common through the 
structure of staged investment. If VCs are unhappy with the 
way the company is being run, they can simply threaten to 
withhold the next round of financing and bring the enterprise 
crashing down. Where the VCs also control the board, the 
  
 236 Even in the late 1990s, when serial entrepreneurs were at their zenith, the 
percentage of VC startups involving serial entrepreneurs—entrepreneurs who had at 
least one prior VC-financed startup—never exceeded fourteen percent. See Paul 
Gompers et al., Skill vs. Luck in Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital: Evidence from 
Serial Entrepreneurs 12 (NBER Working Paper Series, No. 12592, 2006). A recent 
survey of startup founders on LinkedIn found that “only 2% are serial entrepreneurs.” 
Monica Rogati, Sequencing the Startup DNA on LinkedIn, LINKEDIN BLOG (Sept. 1, 
2011), http://blog.linkedin.com/2011/09/01/entrepreneur-data/. 
 237 See Richard A. Booth, Give Me Equity or Give Me Death—The Role of 
Competition and Compensation in Building Silicon Valley 6 (U. Maryland Leg. Stud. Res. 
Paper No. 2006-44, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
940022. 
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power disparity is even more glaring. In this instance, the 
common stockholders are most certainly at the mercy of the 
preferred stockholders. 
The case for mandatory fiduciary duties is further 
bolstered by the possibility of opportunistic amendment. Recall 
that one of the traditional functions of mandatory fiduciary 
duties is to serve as a hands-tying mechanism, preventing the 
party who controls the board from exploiting his control of the 
amendment process to amend the charter to the detriment of 
others. In a VC-financed startup where the common control the 
board, this argument is not compelling. The VC holders of 
preferred stock are concentrated, with no conflicts of interest or 
other collective action problem, and through staged financing 
they maintain strong bargaining leverage, even apart from 
their contractual rights. 
The situation is entirely different for the common 
stockholders where the VC-held preferred control the board. 
First, as I have emphasized, the holders of common stock are 
unlikely to possess the same high level of financial and legal 
sophistication as the VCs. Second, depending on the number of 
employees who have received stock grants, there could be 
dozens—or even hundreds—of holders of common stock. Even 
in the absence of divergent interests, significant collective 
action problems could arise.238 Third, there are likely to be 
significantly divergent interests among the holders of the 
common stock. Entrepreneurs with an eye toward future 
startups may kowtow to the VCs, desiring to maintain a good 
working relationship for future deals. Employees with 
substantial cash compensation may have very different 
interests from those who do not. And, at the end of the day, the 
ability of the VCs to pull the plug on future stages of financing 
provides them with tremendous leverage in extracting 
concessions from the common stockholders. 
In sum, both a straightforward rationale of investor 
protection and the potential for opportunistic amendment 
strongly suggest the propriety of mandatory fiduciary protections 
for common stockholders against controlling preferred 
stockholders. But what of the difficulty, discussed above in Part 
IV, of formulating a meaningful duty of loyalty where the 
conflict of interest is horizontal (between classes of 
  
 238 See Gordon, supra note 203, at 1575-76 (concluding that “collective action 
problems in acquiring and disseminating information among shareholders” will lead to 
“[r]ational apathy”). 
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stockholders) rather than vertical (between, say, management 
and stockholders)? Indeed, this remains a difficulty, though 
there is reason to think it presents less of a difficulty here than 
where the common control the board. 
It presents less of a difficulty for three closely related 
reasons. First, the situations where controlling preferred 
stockholders would legitimately want the right to put their own 
interests ahead of the interests of the common stockholders are 
relatively few in number and can be easily defined. The key 
issue will almost always resemble the situation in Trados and 
Orban—an exit from an investment where the parties’ fondest 
hopes have not been realized, but where some value remains on 
the table. In particular, the VCs will want the ability to liquidate 
or sell the company and receive as much as possible of their 
liquidation preference, even where the common stockholders 
would prefer to continue as an independent going concern. If the 
VCs indeed desire the right to liquidate or sell the company, 
even to the detriment of the common stockholders, they can 
explicitly provide for such a power in the share contract. 
Of course, including explicit contractual provisions will 
only be effective if courts enforce these provisions. Implicit in 
my argument is the conclusion that the fiduciary duties 
extended to the common stockholders should truly serve as 
gap-fillers, and that they must be silent where the contract 
explicitly speaks. This conclusion follows directly from the fact 
that, in this context, no standard of fairness exists that we can 
be confident rational parties would always choose. Allowing 
contractual provisions to, in a sense, elbow fiduciary duties out 
of the way creates an obvious danger that unsophisticated 
common stockholders will not fully appreciate—and price in—the 
power of the preferred to force sale or liquidation. This danger is 
much reduced, however, where the power is spelled out explicitly, 
rather than simply being a silent, implicit consequence of 
preferred stockholder control of the board—as it might very well 
be in the absence of any fiduciary protections at all. 
The other two reasons why fiduciary protection for 
common stockholders would not be as destructive as fiduciary 
protection for preferred stockholders both relate to the relative 
ease of drafting explicit provisions allowing the preferred 
stockholders to prefer their own interests. Again, the actions 
that the preferred might take at the expense of the common 
would tend to be the affirmative exercise of an explicit power, 
for example forcing a liquidation, merger, or redemption. It is 
far easier to draft contractual provisions explicitly allowing all 
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or some such actions—spelling out certain “enumerated 
powers,” so to speak—than to draft contractual provisions 
explicitly forbidding every destructive action imaginable.239 
Finally, the burden of drafting provisions providing the 
preferred with the powers they need would naturally fall upon 
the preferred themselves—in this case the VCs. The VCs, being 
highly sophisticated repeat players, are well situated to 
perform this drafting.240 If the situation were reversed, and 
fiduciary duties were imposed on common-controlled boards, 
the relatively unsophisticated common stockholders would find 
it much more difficult to meet this drafting burden by explicitly 
enumerating all of the situations where controlling common 
stockholders might favor themselves over the preferred. 
In sum, mandatory fiduciary protections for common 
stockholders in the VC context can serve a real purpose, 
without themselves creating insurmountable problems. It is 
plausible—indeed, probable—that common stockholders in VC-
financed startups require protection from exploitative but 
unpriced charter provisions, and from opportunistic amendment. 
Fiduciary duties can provide this protection. And so long as 
these duties are viewed narrowly—as serving a gap-filling 
function—there is little reason to fear that their imposition will 
destabilize mutually beneficial voluntary bargains. 
VI. APPLICATION TO RECENT CASES  
In Parts IV and V, I argued that in the VC context, 
preferred stockholders should be owed no fiduciary duties, 
while controlling preferred should owe fiduciary duties to 
common stockholders. The three recent Delaware cases 
introduced in Part III serve as excellent examples of how this 
regime would work in practice and how the respective situations 
would be resolved. As we shall see, the overall outcome of each of 
the cases remains largely the same, but these outcomes are 
achieved in a more straightforward fashion, with a reduced 
risk of deal-destabilizing uncertainty. 
The result—and even the reasoning—of In re Trados 
remains largely undisturbed. Recall that Chancellor Chandler 
held that the preferred-controlled board of Trados could 
  
 239 See generally Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 
1788), in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 477 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1962). 
 240 In the Conclusion, I will suggest some measures the Delaware courts and 
legislature could take to reduce this drafting burden. 
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potentially breach its fiduciary duties by favoring the interests 
of the preferred over the common.241 In the key passage, 
Chancellor Chandler cited an earlier case in holding that  
generally it will be the duty of the board, where discretionary 
judgment is to be exercised, to prefer the interests of common 
stock—as the good faith judgment of the board sees them to be—to 
the interests created by the special rights, preferences, etc., of 
preferred stock, where there is a conflict.242  
This is entirely in keeping with Part V’s conclusion that 
preferred-controlled boards should owe fiduciary duties to the 
common, requiring them to maximize common stockholder 
wealth. 
While the basic result stands, two aspects of the Trados 
opinion create more uncertainty than is necessary. The first 
difficulty with Chancellor Chandler’s opinion is that he did not 
make it as clear as he might—and perhaps did not intend to 
make it clear—that where the charter explicitly gives the 
preferred the power to force a merger or liquidation, fiduciary 
obligations will not stand in the way. Chancellor Chandler 
repeatedly pointed out that that the board had no contractual 
obligation to pursue a merger favorable to the preferred, nor 
did the preferred have a contractual right to force the sale of 
the company.243 He left it unstated, however, that had the board 
in fact had such an obligation, or had the preferred in fact 
possessed such a right, fiduciary duties would not stand in the 
way, even where, ex post, the result may seem “unfair” to the 
common stockholders. Trados thus leaves a residue of 
uncertainty as to the enforceability of such provisions. This 
uncertainty would be removed by applying the framework 
developed here. 
The second uncertainty created by Trados is a result of 
the lack of clarity as to what standard of fairness should be 
  
 241 See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the Trados case). 
 242 In re Trados, No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 24, 
2009) (quoting Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch. 1997) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 243 Chandler notes that “Defendants [did] not argue that the board had an 
obligation to the preferred stockholders to pursue a transaction that would trigger the 
large liquidation preference of the preferred stock.” Id. at *7 n.38. He goes on to point 
out that while it is “reasonable to infer that the preferred stockholders would benefit 
from a transaction that allowed them to exit the investment while also triggering their 
liquidation preference, [this was] something they did not have a contractual right to 
force the Company to do.” Id. Later in the opinion, Chandler again emphasized that “it 
does not appear that the preferred stockholders had any contractual right to force a 
transaction that would trigger their liquidation preference.” Id. at *7 n.42. 
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employed in determining whether the board had treated the 
common shareholders “fairly.” As in a typical shareholder 
action,244 once the duty of loyalty is implicated, the business 
judgment rule no longer applies, and the burden shifts to the 
defendants—here, the preferred-dominated board—to establish 
that the board acted fairly toward the common stockholders.245 
Typically, of course, fairness would be evaluated according to a 
norm of common-stockholder wealth maximization. And, 
indeed, the framework developed above dictates that a 
preferred-dominated board attempt to maximize common stock 
value, except where the preferred have an explicit contractual 
right to do something that is harmful to the common 
stockholders. Given the calls from many scholars to require a 
norm of maximizing entity value only, however, it would be 
best for the Delaware courts to clarify that no shift in norms is 
intended in this context—that is, that the “fairness” of the 
transaction will be evaluated under the ordinary norm of 
common stockholder wealth maximization. 
The result in James also remains undisturbed under the 
framework developed here, though the bulk of the rather 
extensive dicta runs counter to the analysis. Recall that Vice 
Chancellor Strine held that where the share contract contained 
a plausible benchmark for how the preferred would be treated 
in a merger—here, a conversion provision that allowed the 
preferred to convert their stock to common at a certain ratio 
and then receive the same consideration provided to the 
common—the common-controlled board had no duty to go 
further and provide any “fiduciary beneficence on the preferred 
at the expense of the common.”246 This reasoning is perfectly in 
keeping with the analysis above. 
Vice Chancellor Strine, however, went on to suggest 
that where the contract provided no objective basis for 
treatment of the preferred, Orban required the board to “act as 
a gap-filling agency and do its best to fairly reconcile the 
competing interests of the common and preferred.”247 This dicta 
can only lead to mischief. As argued above, there is no reason 
to think that a share contract’s silence on the treatment of the 
preferred in a merger suggests that the parties necessarily 
want the board to be required to “reconcile the competing 
  
 244 See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). 
 245 In re Trados, 2009 WL 2225958, at *8-9. 
 246 LC Capital Master Fund v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 448-49 (Del. Ch. 2010).  
 247 Id. 
1226 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:4 
interests of the common and preferred” stockholders in a 
merger situation.248 Moreover, there is no straightforward 
standard by which the board could reconcile what are 
essentially irreconcilable differences—division of merger 
proceeds between common and preferred is the quintessential 
zero-sum game.  
Contractual silence should leave the board’s judgment 
unconstrained, not bind it to an unknown and unknowable 
obligation of fairness. If the parties—and particularly the 
preferred—desire a certain guaranteed treatment in a merger, 
they can provide for it in the contract. If they desire “fair 
treatment” according to one standard or another, they can also 
provide for that in the contract. If, for reasons that may or may 
not be clear after the fact, they desire to protect themselves 
entirely through contingent control mechanisms or staged 
financing—or to simply price in the lack of protection—the 
courts should not step in to overrule that choice. To the extent 
that Orban and James would require a court to do so, the 
Delaware courts should revisit and revise them. 
ThoughtWorks is a case that, at first blush, seems to fly 
in the face of the recommendations of Parts IV and V. After all, 
the preferred stockholders explicitly contracted for a 
mandatory redemption right and apparently did everything in 
their power to make this contractual right as broad and strong 
as possible. And yet Vice Chancellor Laster appears to have 
been unwilling to enforce the clear intentions of the parties, 
instead remitting the redemption decision to the judgment of 
the board. This impression, however, is superficial. As Vice 
Chancellor Laster mentions, numerous contractual options 
were available that would have given the preferred the right to 
force payment, even at the risk of insolvency.249 Most simply, 
the preferred could have negotiated a contractual right to force 
liquidation of the firm, with the preferred having priority on 
the proceeds. The “funds legally available” language chosen by 
SVIP simply did not achieve this effect.  
In reality, of course, SVIP would be unable to recover its 
investment in a lump sum no matter what contractual rights it 
negotiated, and no matter how Vice Chancellor Laster 
interpreted the language of the contract. The economic reality 
was that, as an inescapable result of its business model, 
  
 248 Id. at 449. 
 249 See SV Inv. Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d 973, 991-92 
(Del. Ch. 2010). 
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ThoughtWorks was valuable as a going concern but had little 
or no liquidation value.250 SVIP knowingly invested on a gamble 
that ThoughtWorks would quickly go public at a high 
valuation, and its gamble did not pay off. Better 
draftsmanship—or a judge more willing to stretch the meaning 
of the contractual language—would have availed SVIP little. 
In fact, although the parties may not have intended it, 
ThoughtWorks provides an excellent example of contractual 
language that incorporates by reference fiduciary-type 
obligations where they would not otherwise exist. The language 
“funds legally available” explicitly requires the board (and, 
ultimately, a reviewing court) to determine what funds are 
“legally available.” Much like fiduciary duties, the legal 
limitations on the availability of funds for redemption are 
themselves a product of statutory law and case precedents. The 
“funds legally available” language then, rather than creating an 
absolute right to payments under enumerated circumstances, 
instead sets forth a standard—embedded in a body of law—for 
the board to use in determining when a payment to the 
preferred is required. The role of the reviewing court is, as Vice 
Chancellor Laster says, to ensure the board has interpreted 
this standard in “good faith,”251 just as would be required in any 
other contractual dispute. 
Viewed in this light, ThoughtWorks gets it just right. 
The Court refuses to extend any fiduciary protections to the 
preferred and forces them to rely on the protections of their 
contract. And while Vice Chancellor Laster’s interpretation of 
the “funds legally available” language is debatable in terms of 
furthering the parties’ intentions, it preserves maximum 
flexibility for future parties to tailor their contractual 
relationship. If preferred stockholders want the right to force 
immediate repayment, they can negotiate a provision allowing 
them to force liquidation. If preferred stockholders want a 
lesser right to redemption, subject to the existing body of law 
on when funds are “legally available,” they can use that 
language. Had the Court interpreted this language to mean 
what SVIP argued it meant, it would have eliminated this 
latter option as a practical matter, while availing SVIP little.  
  
 250 See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the ThoughtWorks case). 
 251 ThoughtWorks, 7 A.3d at 989. 
1228 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:4 
CONCLUSION 
This article’s major conclusion is that preferred 
stockholders should never be afforded fiduciary protections 
against common-dominated boards of directors. Rather, they 
should be required to rely on the protections of their contract. 
The traditional rationales for the imposition of fiduciary duties 
do not apply in the context of preferred stock used for venture 
capital financing. The financial and legal sophistication of VCs, 
their frequent status as repeat players, the heavily bargained 
nature of venture capital financing, the strong bargaining 
power of VCs, the lack of collective action problems, advances 
in contracting technique, and the lack of any clear majoritarian 
defaults or norms of fairness all combine to make corporate 
fiduciary duties unnecessary at best, and at worst affirmatively 
destructive of voluntary contractual bargains. 
The supplemental conclusion is that even though 
preferred stockholders should not be entitled to fiduciary 
protection, preferred-dominated boards should owe fiduciary 
duties to the common stockholders. When VC preferred control 
the board, standard corporate fiduciary protections for common 
stockholders will generally be appropriate. This conclusion 
should not be taken to suggest, however, that courts should be 
cavalier in ignoring contractual provisions in the name of 
equity. Great care must be taken not to allow fiduciary duties 
to displace voluntary bargains and destabilize contractual 
relationships. Where the preferred have secured an explicit 
contractual right, they should not be prevented from exercising 
it, even where it appears to harm the common stockholders—
and even where it appears to harm the enterprise as a whole. 
“Fairness” in a given venture capital scenario is unlikely to be 
a straightforward proposition, particularly in hindsight. If 
venture capital is to remain a vital force for innovation and 
wealth creation, courts must be careful “lest they upset what 
they do not understand.”252  
As a result, the fiduciary duties imposed on preferred 
stockholders in relation to common stockholders should be 
limited to the “gap filler” fiduciary duties envisioned by 
contractarian scholars. Any attempt to use fiduciary duties to 
impose a contract-trumping requirement of “fairness” is likely 
to do more harm than good. 
  
 252 Baird & Henderson, supra note 2, at 1314. 
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The refusal to provide fiduciary protections to preferred 
stockholders in VC-financed startups places a high drafting 
burden on the VCs. Whatever protections they will receive 
must be provided through the contract. This burden is far from 
insurmountable, and concerns that the preferred shareholder 
relationship is inherently noncontractible are fundamentally 
misplaced. Nonetheless, there are undoubtedly measures that 
Delaware could take to reduce what is unquestionably a heavy 
drafting burden. I will close by suggesting two. 
First, the Delaware legislature could make clear the 
ability of parties to “opt into” fiduciary duties where they 
otherwise would not exist. As discussed in Part IV, the mere 
fact that a contractual relationship traverses some 
“noncontractible terrain” does not, by itself, justify the 
imposition of mandatory fiduciary duties. After all, the parties 
can voluntarily choose to impose fiduciary duties contractually. 
This argument loses force, however, if there is substantial 
uncertainty as to whether and how the courts will interpret 
and enforce “fiduciary provisions” in the charter. The legislature 
could eliminate any uncertainty by providing in the Delaware 
Code that a charter may include a provision providing fiduciary 
duties to preferred stockholders, and that the inclusion of such a 
provision will allow the preferred to invoke the entire body of 
Delaware fiduciary duty decisional law. 
The Delaware courts could also take steps to reduce 
error. When a dispute leads to litigation, the preferred 
stockholders will typically be arguing that the share contract 
grants them a particular power or, conversely, that the share 
contract provides them with a particular kind of protection. 
Where the court ultimately finds that the contract does not 
provide the power or protection sought, it would behoove the 
judge to provide a clear and simple provision that would have.253 
This could be as simple as providing that contracting parties in 
the future can explicitly refer to the case name in question, as 
an unambiguous signal of the intention of the parties.254 The 
Delaware courts are already fairly diligent about suggesting 
  
 253 Ian Ayres has recently suggested something similar, as a general judicial 
policy. See generally Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt Out: An Economic Theory of Altering 
Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2055 (2012). 
 254 As an example, parties desiring the preferred to have the power to enter 
into a merger at any time, even where it wipes out the common stock, could make 
explicit reference to In re Trados. See id. at 2082-83 (suggesting that contracting 
parties be allowed to alter default rules “by adding an explicit citation” to court 
decisions discussing such alterations). 
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the ways in which the losing party—usually the preferred—
could have drafted the contract in such a way as to prevail. In 
Vice Chancellor Laster’s ThoughtWorks opinion, for example, 
he rattled off several mechanisms that would have entitled the 
preferred to force redemption payments.255 Doing this more 
consistently, and as clearly as possible, would, over time, help 
to develop a body of unambiguous, judicially approved 
contractual provisions from which the parties to VC 
transactions could pick and choose as needed. 
Together, these two measures would go at least some 
way toward diminishing the heavy drafting burden that the 
framework developed in this article would place on VCs. 
  
 255 See ThoughtWorks, 7 A.3d at 990-92. Of course, given the economics of the 
company, even if SVIP had an enforceable legal right to force payments, they would 
have been unlikely to recover much actual cash. 
